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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL,

Docket No. 890143-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

I.
SPECIFIC RULE CONFERRING JURISDICTION
ON THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECIDE THIS APPEAL.
The case that is before this Court on appeal was
heard in Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department, in
and for Utah County, State of Utah, on or about the 28th day
of February, 1989.

The Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals,

Rules 1 and 3(a), confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals
to decide the Appeal of the final decision rendered in the
Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department, in and for
Utah County, State of Utah.
II.
CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE APPEAL.
This appeal is from a final judgment rendered by a
jury in the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department,
in and for Utah County, State of Utah, where defendant/
appellant JOSEPH E. NOVOSEL was found guilty of driving under
1

the influence of alcohol.
III.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.
Fourth

Whether the road block in question violated the

Amendment

of the United

States Constitution

and

Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution as an unjustified

stop,

search

and

seizure

of

defendant/appellant

NOVOSEL.
2.
NOVOSEL

Whether

the requiring of defendant/appellant

to perform field sobriety tests based solely on a

mild odor of alcohol and reddened eyes violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14, of the Utah Constitution.
3.
NOVOSEL

Whether

the arrest

of

defendant/appellant

for a DUI following his performance of the field

tests was unjustified and violated the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14, of
the Utah Constitution.
4.

Whether

the refusal of the trial court to

preempt certain veniremen for cause based upon their bias and
prejudice against drinking alcohol was prejudicial error.
5.

Whether

the refusal of the trial court to

preempt certain veniremen based upon their familiarity with
the prosecuting attorney, the arresting officer, and with
other veniremen was prejudicial error.
6.

Whether

the trial court's refusal
2

to read

certain jury instructions concerning probable cause for a
stop was prejudicial error.
7.

Whether the trial court's denial of defendant's

Motion for Dismissal at the close of the State's case was
proper.
8.

Whether the trial court's denial of defendant's

objections and motion to strike Officer Beeder's statement
concerning a field test, which had been suppressed prior to
trial, was prejudicial error.
9.

Whether the evidence derived at time of trial

was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty.
IV.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES.
The Constitutional
this

appeal

is based

Fourteenth Amendments

provisions and statutes that

on are:

The

Fourth, Sixth and

to the United States Constitution;

Article I, Section 12 and Article I, Section 14, of the
Constitution of the State of Utah; and Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, U.C.A. 77-35-18, Rule 18 (2)(e): (4) and (14).
V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
HISTORY
On or about August

1, 1987, defendant/appellant

JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was stopped at a roadblock located at SR-68
at 6800 North, Lehi, Utah.

(Exhibit "A", T.R.
3

p. 53, In. 1,

2, 14-23.)
mentioned

Subsequent

to his being stopped at the above

roadblock, JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was arrested and

charged with DUI.

(See Exhibit "A".)

On or about November 14, 1987, appellant's Motion
to

Suppress

Evidence

or

in the Alternative

to Dismiss

(attached hereto as Exhibit "B") was heard in the Utah County
Justice Court, Precinct No. 1, Pleasant Grove, State of Utah,
where the Justice of the Peace denied appellant's motion.
On or about April 1, 1988, a jury trial was held in
the Utah County Justice Court, Precinct No. 1, Pleasant
Grove, State of Utah, where a finding of guilty was entered
in the above said court.
Within

thirty

(30) days

following

appellant's

conviction in the Utah County Justice Court, Precinct No. 1,
Pleasant Grove, State of Utah, appellant filed his request
for a de novo trial.
On or about May 26, 1988, appellant's Motion to
Suppress Evidence or in the Alternative to Dismiss was heard
in the Fourth Circuit Court, American Fork Department, in and
for Utah County, State of Utah.

On or about July 6, 1988,

Circuit Court Judge John Backlund denied appellant's Motion
to Suppress or in the Alternative to Dismiss finding that the
roadblock

in that case was not an unreasonable stop and

seizure of the defendant.
On or about February 10, 1989, appellant filed a
second Motion to Suppress Evidence or in the Alternative to
4

Dismiss.

(Attached hereto as Exhibit "C".)

On or about

February 28, 1989, American Fork Circuit Court Judge Backlund
denied appellant's second motion.
On or about February 10, 1989, appellant filed a
Motion in Limine.
about February

(Attached hereto as Exhibit "D".)

On or

28, 1989, the Fourth Circuit Court granted

appellant's motion suppressing the field sobriety test known
as the Horizontal Gaze-Nystagmus test.
Appellant made a continuing objection as to all of
the evidence introduced as a result of the roadblock stop,
which the trial court overruled.

(See Exhibit "A", T.R. p.

55, In. 1-6.)
Appellant moved

to strike statements by Officer

Beeder alluding to a field test which had been suppressed at
the pretrial Motion in Limine.

(Exhibit "A"f T.R. p. 109.

In. 20-24.)
Appellant moved at the close of the State's case to
dismiss the charge of DUI against appellant on each of the
two theories proposed by the prosecution.
T.R.

p.

139-142.)

The

trial

(See Exhibit

court denied

appellant's motion to dismiss during the trial.

f,

A",

defendant/
(See Exhibit

"A", T.R. p. 142.)
On February 28, 1989, a jury in the Fourth Circuit
Court, American Fork Department, in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, found defendant/appellant guilty of DUI and
the finding was entered

in the above-said
5

court.

(See

Exhibit "See Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 201, 202.)
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on or March 13,
1989.

Appellant

judgment

from

seeks a review of the February 28, 1989

the

Fourth Circuit

Court, American

Fork

Department, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, finding
defendant/appellant guilty, as well as a review of each of
the prejudicial errors committed by the trial court as stated
above.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August

1, 1987, defendant/appellant JOSEPH A.

NOVOSEL was returning home from a family outing when he was
stopped at a temporary roadblock at SR-68, at 6800 North,
Lehi, Utah.

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 53, In. 1, 2, 14-23.)

The officers conducting the roadblock did not observe any
traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity
prior to stopping Mr. NOVOSEL.

(See Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 60,

In. 16-21.)
Arresting Officer Beeder spoke with defendant/
appellant and observed that his speech was not slurred, that
his answers were appropriate, that his responses were prompt,
and that he was polite and courteous.

(See Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 98, In. 11-24.)
The roadblock in question was a temporary roadblock
as opposed to a permanent roadblock.
notices given of this roadblock.

There were no prior

(See Exhibit "E", State of

Utahrs response to defendant/appellant!s Second Request for
6

Discovery, No. 3.)

The purpose of the roadblock was to

check for licenses, registration and consumption of alcohol.
(See Exhibit "E", No. 15.)

There is no record of the number

of persons stopped at the roadblock herein.
Response No. 7.)

There is no record of the number of DUI

arrests made at this roadblock.
8.)

(Exhibit "E",

(Exhibit "E", Response No.

There is no record of the number of other arrests at

this roadblock.

(Exhibit "E", Response No. 9.)

There is no

record of other citations given at this roadblock.
"E", Response No. 10.)

(Exhibit

There is no record of any specific

directions, guidelines nor instructions given to the police
officers concerning

the law enforcement at the roadblock,

other than those contained in the two-page document entitled,
"Utah County Sheriff's Policy on Roadblocks."

(See Exhibit

"F", State of Utah's reply to defendant/appellant's Third
Request

for Discovery, Response No. 1.)

Officers at the

roadblock had considerable discretion in dealing with persons
stopped at the roadblock and were not instructed on whether
or not to look through vehicles for evidence, how long to
detain each vehicle, whether to attempt to smell for alcohol
or other contraband, what to do if a vehicle made a legal Uturn before arriving at the roadblock, nor were they given
any

specific directive

concerning

the questioning

motorist who was stopped at this roadblock.

of a

No empirical

data was available to demonstrate that roadblocks are more
effective in dealing with the drunk driving problem versus
7

traditional

roving patrols.

(Exhibits

ff ,f

E

and "F" above,

which are the State of Utahfs reply to defendant/appellant's
Second and Third Requests for Discovery.)

No complaints,

reports, nor extra patrol requests nor deputies1 personal
knowledge

for the need of a roadblock as concerns alcohol

violators have been provided.

(Exhibits

"E" and

"F".)

Defendant/appellant was stopped solely as a result of the
roadblock.

(See Exhibit

"A", T.R.

p. 60, In.

19-21.)

Arresting Officer Tracy smelled a mile odor of alcohol and
observed nothing else before performing the field tests.
(Exhibit

"A", T.R.

p. 76, Ln. 10-19.)

Based upon the

arresting officer's observation of a mild odor of alcohol
(Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 96, ln. 12, 13.), defendant/appellant

was required to perform field tests.
99,

ln. 10-15.).

passed (Exhibit "A", T.R.
and

completed.

p.

Defendant/ appellant performed the field

sobriety tests, including

5-7);

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

a hand/slap
(Exhibit

the heel to toe test, which he
p. 109, ln. 15-21 and p. 119, In.

test, which

"A", T.R.

defendant/appellant

p. 101, In. 15-16.)

The

hand/slap test is not taught by the POST Academy and there is
nothing from POST instructing how to judge a pass or fail of
this test.

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

, p. 99, In. 25 and p. 100,

ln. 5-9.)

Defendant/appellant's

ability to follow these

instructions was good and he easily understood instructions
and verbalized without problems.
ln. 21-25 and p. 102, ln. 2.)

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 101,

The State's expert, Taylor,
8

stated that NOVOSEL, "could have been under the legal limit
when driving, and that nobody knows or would know what his
blood/ alcohol would have been at the time of driving."
(Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 136, In. 22-25.)

Defendant/appellant

stated he had consumed three beers within a half hour prior
to driving before he was stopped at the roadblock.
"A", T.R.

(Exhibit

p. 168, In. 22-24.)

VI.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.
On or about August

1, 1987, at about 6:24

PM,

defendant/appellant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was improperly stopped
at a police roadblock at SR-68, at 6800 North, Lehi, Utah.
Such DUI roadblocks set up for the purpose of stopping all
traffic

without

any

reasonable suspicion
Fourth

Amendment's

articulable

facts giving

rise to

for a stop are in violation of the
United

States Constitutional

and of

Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitutional rights to
freedom from unlawful search and seizure.

The intrusion on

individual rights from such a stop outweighs any accompanying
public interest that may be a corollary of such roadblocks.
Information seized at such roadblocks should be
suppressed
seized.

on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally

Information that is obtained as a result of an

unconstitutional search and seizure should be suppressed in
order

to discourage police using such
9

unconstitutional

tactics.
The r i g h t
guaranteed

by

Constitution

the
and

Constitution.

t o an i m p a r t i a l
Sixth
by

trial

Amendment

Article

Implicit

I,

in

of

by o n e ' s p e e r s
the

Section

that

right

United

12,

of

is

the

o b j e c t i v e h e a r i n g of t h e f a c t s by s u c h a j u r y .

veniremen

were

not

impartial

because

the

Beeder.

been

Furthermore,

preempted

for

certain

cause

of

their

of

arresting

bias

p a r t i a l i t y a s e x p r e s s e d by t h e i r m o r a l p r e d i s p o s i t i o n
drinking

alcohol

venireman

Gottfredson

because

of

his

in

any

circumstances.

should

expressed

have
and

against

Furthermore,

have b e e n p r e e m p t e d
moral

the

prior

should

their

to

case,

Some of

veniremen

because

Utah

right

a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h S t a t e A t t o r n e y S h e r r i e Ragan and
officer

States

In t h i s

t h e j u r y was n o t composed of an o b j e c t i v e b o d y .

in

predisposition

for

cause

against

d r i n k i n g a l c o h o l u n d e r any c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
Also i m p l i c i t

in the r i g h t to a jury t r i a l

p e e r s i s t o have a t r i a l where t h e f a c t - f i n d e r s
ently.
four

In t h i s
(4)

actions,
be f a i r
fair.

of
at

be

veniremen

knew e a c h

other

leaned over to ask another venireman if
"A", T.R.
grounds

preempted.

mentioned

and

l e a s t one s u c h v e n i r e m a n when a s k e d i f

(Exhibit

independ-

c a s e t h a t was n o t p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e a t

the

show s u f f i c i e n t
to

act

by o n e ' s

above

In
were

p . 34, I n .
for

allowing

this

case,

preempted
10

18, 19.)
the
none

for

cause

by

their

she

could

t h e y c o u l d be
Such a c t i o n s

involved
of

least

the
and

veniremen
veniremen
thus

the

defendant did not receive a fair and impartial hearing.
Finally, the evidence derived at the time of the
trial was not sufficient to support a guilty verdict.

Taken

in total, there was not sufficient evidence to confirm in the
mind of an objective venireman that the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant/appellant had
appropriate responses, speech and thought, was able to pass
the heel to toe test and the State?s expert testified that
defendant/appellant

could have been under the legal limit

while driving his vehicle.
VII.
ARGUMENT,
A.

APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION
14, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, WAS BREACHED WHEN HE WAS
STOPPED BY A DUI ROADBLOCK.
In the United States it has been established that

police officers may not randomly stop a vehicle to check
license and registration without a reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing.

Such a stop is unconstitutional

because it

leaves too much discretion to the police officers.

See

t

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 468 (1979); 99 S. Ct. 1391.
There the United States Supreme Court stated:
Except where there is at least articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed
or that an automobile is not registered, or that
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise
subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping
an automobile and detaining the driver in order to
check his driver's license and the registration of
11

the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
The

Prouse

Court

further stated

the rule

for

automobile stops.
Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitute a "seizure11 within the meaning of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though the
purpose of the stop is limited and resulting
detention quite brief.
The permissibility of a
particular law enforcement practice is judged by
balancing its intrusion of the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests. Id.
As set out by the Prouse case, the test is one of
balancing

the

Amendment's

intrusion

into

an

individual's

Fourth

interests against the promotion of legitimate

governmental

interests.

As stated earlier, in this case

there were no articulable legitimate governmental interests,
because the State has shown no records to support the degree
to which roadblocks promote governmental interests.
Statement of the Facts, page 6.)
of

argument,

numerous

the

Nonetheless for purposes

factors considered

applying the balancing test are:

(See,

by courts

in

The amount of discretion

officer at the roadblock maintained; whether

prior

notices of the location and purpose of the roadblock were
given to motorists to prevent surprise; whether the roadblock
was a permanent

roadblock or a temporary roadblock; the

purpose of the roadblock; the time of day of the roadblock;
and

whether

less

intrusive

methods were available

accomplish the alleged State's interests.

to

Ekstrom v. State

of Arizona, 663 P. 2d, 992, 994 (Ariz. 1983); 136 Az. 1;
12

State v, Koppel, 499 A. 2nd 977, 978 (N.H. 1985); 127 N.H.
286;

State v. Holley,

Second District Court, in and for

Weber County, State of Utah, Case No. 16530 (See attached
Exhibit "G,f ; State v. Smith, 674 P. 2d, 562, 565 (Okl. CR
1984);

Delaware v. Prouse, (supra); State v. Marchand, 706

P. 2d, 225 (Wash. 1985); 104 W. 2d 434; and State v. Olqaard,
248 N.W. 2d, 392, (S.D. 1976).

Each of the above courts held

that the intrusion of the roadblock was too great and thereby
held the roadblock unconstitutional.
Many instances in the cases above have a parallel
instant in the case at bar.

In Ekstrom, the court found in

that roadblock, "the grave danger that such discretion might
be abused by the officer in the field, a fact which caused
the court in United States v. Prouse, (supra) , much concern.11
Ekstrom at 996.

In the case at bar, there is no record of

any specific directions, guidelines or instructions given to
each officer concerning the law enforcement at the roadblock
and the officers had considerable discretion in dealing with
persons stopped at the roadblock.
page 6.)

See, Statement of Facts,

In the case at bar, as in Ekstrom, officers:

. . . were not told what to do if a vehicle turned
around to avoid the roadblock. They were not told
whether to inspect visible cans or bottles. They
were not told whether to shine a flashlight in each
vehicle that was stopped after dark. They were not
told whether to smell inside each vehicle to detect
the smell of alcohol. Ekstrom at 993.
Even though vehicles in Ekstrom were detained from 30 to 40
seconds to five minutes, the court held that the degree of
13

intrusion in light of the surprise and fright occasioned on
the motorists was a significant and substantial intrusion.
Id,
In Smith, the court stated:
The roadblocks in the present case could well act,
and most likely did act, as a total surprise to
those passing through.
The subjective intrusion,
for example, fear and apprehension, potentially
imposed upon the individual innocent of misconduct
is simply too great. Smith at 564 (supra)
In Ekstrom, the court found in that roadblock, "the
grave danger that such discretion might be abused by the
officer in the field, a fact which caused the court in United
States v. Prouse, (supra), much concern."
The Koppel court

Ekstrom at 996.

found that an unpublicized and temporary

drunk driving roadblock that was set up in the evening:
. produces a substantially greater amount of
"subjective intrusion—a generation of concern or
even fright on the part of lawful travellers, . .
. " (Martinez/Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at
3083) than does a permanent roadblock whose
existence and purpose are common knowledge. Koppel
at 983.
In the present case, there was no advertising nor
prior media notice of the temporary roadblock which was set
up in the evening hours.
The purpose of the roadblock in the present case
was to check for drunk drivers.

(See Exhibit "D".)

In State v. Smith, 674 P. 2d, 562, 564 (Okl. CR
1984), the court stated that the:
end justifies the means approach [in an attempt to
remove DUI offenders from the public highways]
draw[s] dangerous close to what may be referred to
14

as a police state.
The Smith court held that:
. the Fourth Amendment protection against an
unreasonable seizure of the person is violated by
the use of a temporary roadblock as a means to stop
all traffic (or traffic at established intervals)
without any articulable facts giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion for the stop, for the purpose
of seeking out criminal DUI offenders.
State v.
Smith, 674 P. 2d, 562, 565 (Okl. CR 1984).
T

^e

Smith court recognized that "a basic tenet of American

jurisprudence
conduct

is that government

cannot assume

criminal

in effectuating a stop such as the one presented

herein."

Id.
In S m i t h ,

as

statutory

authority

indirectly,

the S t a t e ' s

in

the

which

case at
would

t h e r e was

"no

directly

or

support,

has t h e power

to

e s t a b l i s h checkpoints to inspect a l l motorists to discern

if

they

are

contention

hand,

intoxicated."

Id,

at

that

565.

it

All

of

the

evidence

o b t a i n e d a t t h e roadblock i n Smith was s u p p r e s s e d .
The
logical
Weber
Holley,
in

reasoning

and a d o p t e d

County

in

by

State

from
the
v.

the

Smith

court

Utah Second D i s t r i c t

Holley,

(see

Exhibit

the Utah Second D i s t r i c t Court adopted t h e

Smith,

ruling

unconstitutional,

that

the

despite

roadblock

evidence

that

in

found

Court
"G").

the

of
In

reasoning

question

q u e s t i o n was p r o f e s s i o n a l l y and s a f e l y condupted.
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was

roadblock
Id.

was
in

B.

ALL INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE CONCERNING JOSEPH A.
NOVOSEL WHICH WAS SEIZED AT THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ROADBLOCK MENTIONED HEREIN SHOULD BE EXCLUDED UNDER THE
"EXCLUSIONARY RULE."
As the court knows the so called exclusionary rule

is a procedural rule of Federal Consitutional law used to
deter unlawful police conduct.

Under the exclusionary rule,

evidence of all material seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment

is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding.

This

rule was made applicable to the states under Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); 81 S.Ct. 1684.

It has long been held

that no evidence seized as a result of a Fourth Amendment
Violation may be admitted at trial.

(See Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 83 S.Ct. 407.

The information

seized at the roadblock in this case should be suppressed
because it was seized in violation of Mr. NOVOSEL's Fourth
Amendment

right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures.
C.

JOSEPH A. NOVOSELfS SIXTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL BEFORE A JURY OF HIS PEERS
AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, WAS BREACHED BECAUSE THE JURY THAT HEARD
HIS CASE WAS NOT FAIR AND IMPARTIAL.
It is a well-established

point

that

the Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions is
applicable to states as being "fundamental to the American
scheme of
(1968).

justice."

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145

In the case at bar, Mr. NOVOSEL was charged with

driving under the influence of alcohol.
16

A venireman who has

a predisposed belief that consumption of alcohol was per se
immoral cannot be fair and impartial when sitting as a trier
of fact where the accused is charged with a crime involving
the drinking of alcohol.
U. C. A. 77-35-18, Rule 18(e) (14), of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a challenge for
cause is proper where:

. a s t a t e of mind e x i s t s on the part of the
j u r o r with r e f e r e n c e to the cause, or to e i t h e r
p a r t y , w h i c h w i l l p r e v e n t him from a c t i n g
i m p a r t i a l l y and w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of the party challenging [the
juror].
Utah courts have held that, "impartiality has been defined as
a mental attitude of appropriate indifference."

State v.

Brooks, Utah, 453 P. 2d 799, 801 (1977).
In the case at bar, venireman Gottfredson stated
that he felt it was morally wrong to drink an alcoholic
beverage or beer.
23, In 1-9.)

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 22, In 19-25 and p.

Venireman Gottfredson also stated that he has

counselled a lot of people about drinking alcohol, " .
because of the problems
(Exhibit "A", T.R.

that it causes in their home."

p. 23, In. 7-9.)

When asked by the trial

court if he could be fair and impartial given that belief, he
stated,

"I think

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

so," rather

than an unequivocal yes.

p. 23, In. 6.)

The Utah Supreme Court has held:
A juror who has formed "strong and deep impressions
which will close the mind against the testimony
that may be offered in. opposition to them; which
17

will combat that testimony and resist its force"
should be excused for cause.
State v. Hewitt,
Utah, 689 P. 2d 22, 25 (1984); citing Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155, 25 L.Ed. 244
(1878).
Venireman Gottfredson should have been removed for
cause because he could not be impartial in light of his expressed strong, moral convictions that it was wrong to drink
alcohol.

Clearly Gottfredson's strong moral convictions

against drinking make him significantly biased and partial
against defendant/appellant who is charged with driving under
the influence of alcohol.

The defense moved the trial court

to dismiss Gottfredson for cause, but the trial court denied
the motion (Exhibit "A", T.R.
was forced

p. 39, In. 2-8.).

to use its remaining peremptory

The defense
challenge to

remove venireman Gottfredson.
The Utah court in State v. Bishop, Utah 753 P. 2d
439, 451 (1988), stated:
It is prejudicial error to compel a party to
exercise their peremptory challenge to remove a
panel member who should have been removed for
cause.
The trial court1s refusal to remove Gottfredson from the jury
panel for cause was, therefore, prejudicial error.
Venireman Ms. Searle, who stated

that she knew

Sherry Ragan, the prosecutor in the case, while they taught
at the same elementary school, should also have been removed
from

the

prosecutor.

jury

for cause via her relationship

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 8, In. 5-9.)

court refused to remove Ms. Searle.
18

with

the

The trial

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

p.

39, In. 16-22.)
The trial court in refusing to remove venireman
Shaffer from the jury panel (Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 39, In 9-

11.) committed prejudicial error since Ms. Shaffer by her
actions demonstrated
independent
evidenced

that she would be unable to give an

opinion of the case as a juror.

by Ms. Shaffer f s

response

This was

to the question of

whether she would give in to her honest opinion because of
her familiarity with another venireman, Ms. Vance, to which
she responded

in action by leaning forward and asking Ms.

Vance, "We could be fair, couldn't we?"

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 34, In. 18-19.
The trial court was unduly influenced by judicial
economy concerning the selection of jurors when it stated in
response to defendant's challenges for cause, "Well, if I
strike all those people, we'll be coming for another jury
trial with a different jury.

I just—I mean, it's obvious if

I do that, we won't have enough, we won't have four people
left, b u t — . "

(Exhibit "A", T.R.

p. 35, In. 25, p. 36, In

1-3.)
VIII.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the constitutional provisions, statutes,
facts, arguments and multiple prejudicial errors committed by
the trial court as stated herein, appellant's constitutional
rights were violated

and a fair trial was not afforded
19

appellant.

Therefore, appellant

respectfully moves this

Honorable Court to reverse the decision of the trial court
named herein.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of June, 1989.

MITCHEL ZAGER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to counsel for
plaintiff/respondent Sherrie Ragan, Utah County Prosecutor,
37 East Center, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601, on the 19th day
of June, 1989.

MITCHEL ZAGER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM I
AMENDMENT IV
U.S. CONSTITUTION
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

21

ADDENDUM II
AMENDMENT VI
U.S. CONSTITUTION
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertain by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of

the accusation;

against

him;

to be confronted

to have

with

compulsory process

the witnesses
for

obtaining

witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel
for his defence.

22

ADDENDUM III
AMENDMENT XIV
U. S. CONSTITUTION
Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the

United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny

to any

person

within

protection of the laws.

23

its

jurisdiction

the equal

ADDENDUM IV
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right

to appear and defend

in person and by counsel, to

demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel

the attendance of witnesses in his own

behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed.

The accused shall not be compelled

to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
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ADDENDUM V
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall

issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or

affirmation,

particularly

describing

the place

searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

25

to be

ADDENDUM VI
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, TITLE 77-35-18
Rule 18 (2)(e) (4); (14) - Selection of Jury.
(2)

A challenge to an individual juror may be either

peremptory or for cause.

A challenge to an individual juror

may be made only before the jury is sworn to try the action,
except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made
after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is
presented.

In challenges for cause the rules relating to

challenges to be panel and hearings thereon shall apply.

All

challenges for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution
and then by the defense.
(e)
(4)

The existence of any social, legal, business,

fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror
and

any

party, witness

or person alleged

to have

been

victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship
when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds
that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to
return a verdict which would be free of favoritism.

A

prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he
is indebted

to or employed by the state or a political

subdivision thereof;
(14)

That a state of mind exists on the part of the

juror with references to the cause, or to either party, which
will

prevent

him

from

acting
26

impartially

and

without

prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging;
but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of
having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or
cause to be submitted

to such jury, founded upon public

rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if
it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can and
will, notwithstanding

such opinion, act impartially and

fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.
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1

anyone from the prosecution?

2

Are you Ann Searle?

3

MS. SLARLL:

4

THU COUKT:

5 J

MS. SEARLE:

6

THL COURT;

7 i

Yes.
Yes, ma 1 an.
I know Sherry Rarrgn.
And what is the nature of that

acquaintanceship?

8

MS.

Ue taught at the same elementary

SHARLJL.:

9 school.
10

Til* COURT:

11 1

MS. SiJARLb:

12

THE COURT:

And how long zro

was that, ma'an?

It's been oh, ten years ago or so.
And were you—how ^rould you

13 characterize your friendship?

T T

- ere you real close-—

14

MS. SLARLL;

15

THE COURT:

— o r did you just know her as another

17

MS. S1ARL1,;

oust know who~-uh huh (affirmative).

18

THE COURT:

No.

16 teacher?

Uould you have any tendency to favor

19 the State in this natter because ^hc*s the prosecutor, as
20 opposed to the defense?
21

MS. SEARLE:

22

TEE COURT:

You think that yon could be totally

23 fair and impartial?
24

MS. SRATXE:

25

TEE COURT:

Vo<5 .

Thank you.

3
EXHIBIT "A'

Anybody else?

1

1

tendency to give greater w e i g h t to the testimony of a law

2

enforcement officer as opposed to the testimony of
else because of that fact

someone

alone?

4

UNIDENTIFIED F b M A L E JUROR:

5

THE C O U R T :

I don't believe so.

Thank you.
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Is there anyone on the jury panel who has
strong feelings against the use of alcohol, whether

such
those

8

are j u s t — n o t

9

or that they're also in p a r t based upon religion that y o u

just; but w h e t h e r those are a personal b e l i e f ,

10

c o u l d — t h a t you feel that you could not be fair and

tt

in this case?

12

impartial

Anyone?

A r e there any r. embers on the jury p a n e l w h o

13 I abstain from drinking any type of alcoholic b e v e r a g e ,
14
15
16

including beer?
Let's have y o u keep y o u r bands up for just a
rnonient so Counsel can take n o t e ,

17

18

^
20

21

T/FIDj-.l;,rIFlxJD il?l>£, JUROR-

Uhat w a s the q u e s t i o n ,

sir?
Till: C O U R T :

The wiiastior. i s .

are there any members

'on the jury panel w h o abstain from drinking any type of
alcoholic b e v e r a g e , including

beer?

22

T h a n k y o u very n u c h .

23

Do any of the -errbers on the jury panel believe it

24

is m o r a l l y w r o n g to drink an alcoholic beverace or beer?

I

25 know that's a hard q u e s t i o n and it's--the phrasing of it is

??

1

different.

If you feel that it's morally wrong to drink an

2 alcoholic beverage or beer, please raise your hand.

Thank

3 you.
4
i'~r. Gottfreason, given that belief, do you still
5 feel that you can be fair and impartial in this case today?
6

:u..

Gv/rTrRjL-iL'bO: •:

L tnink :-:o.

i've served m

a—

7 as a bishop and in bishoprics for 13 years, and Ifve
8 counseled a lot of people about things Like this because of
9 the problems that it causer-; in their hone.
10

2Hii COURT;

11

Do any of the jurors believe that because a person

Ail right.

Oh^.nk you, sir. _

12 is accused of a violation of the lav; that that person is
13 guilty unless he can show otherwise?

Do any of you have

14 that feeling or opinion?
15

IT.. ZACbR;

Your lienor, I believe h"r. Hinckley

16 rr.ight have also had his hand raised.
17

•TI£L COURT;

On the question, do you thin'-: it's

18 rr.orally wrong to drink an alcoholic beverage or beer; did
19 you raise your hand on that, i!r. Hinckley?
20

I'ri sorry, 1 didn't—I f,n not as observant as I

21 should be.

In spite of that belief, do you still feel you

22 can be fair and impartial to both sides, rriven your earlier
23 response-that we have on the record on the other natter
24 involvincr the accident ,ror>* wi "F*» had?
25 ;•

113.. HI1;CT.'LLY;

I think it's Morally wrong, but I

22

,

1

1

THE COURT:

Thank you.

2

KR. ZAGERi

Following would be No. 4, Phillip

3 Hinckley.

He's the individual who knows Charlie Beeder, the

4 main officer in this case, knows his dad quite well.
5 Although he stated that he would be able to be fair, I think
6

the fact that he knows the family, knows the boy growing up,

7

it's going to be very difficult for him to distrust a long-

8

time family relation and friend.

9 it was morally wrong to drink.

Ee also stated that hev f elt
And for those reasons, I

10 would move to preempt for cause.
11

TSL COURT:

All right.

12

KS. ZAGiiK:

The next juror I have a problem with is

13 Juror Ko. 5, that would be Claudia Vance.

She knows Bonnie

14 Schaeffer, and although I didn't have a problem with N o . —
15 Marjean Sawyer and Ann dearie for knowing each other, I did
16 notice that when you asked the question, would they be
17 influenced by each other's decision, that Bonnie Schaeffer
18 leaned over to Claudia Vance and said, "Vie could be fair,
19 couldn't we", I mean, so it seemed to be, even from watching
20 what was taking place in the jury box, that she was asking
21 for reassurance from the other juror who is the friend of
22 hers, which seemed to answer the question about fairness
23 better than her actual answer.

And I would move to preempt

24 her for cause.
25

The next one I would preempt for cause would be

1 r,arl Laycock, No. 6 on ny l i s t — I ' m sorry, Jack Hill, excuse
2 me.
3
4
5

Jack Hill, for reasons that he teaches driver's

education and the effects of alcohol, and instead of an
affirmative yes to the question of whether he could be fair,
he said he thought he could be, and the hesitation there

6 would lead me to move for a preemptory by cause.
7

The next juror I would move for preemption for

8

cause, I know I've already mentioned, excuse me,' Phillip

9

Hinckley, and I notice in my notes also, Phillip Hinckley

10 is the individual whose wife was involved in a traffic
11 accident due to a DUX or an alcohol-related experience, and
12 he said he didn't feel good about that experience, when
13 asked if he could be fair and impartial.

So, that would be

14 another basis for Phillip Hinckley.
15

The final cne

that I would move to preempt for

16 cause would be Ann Searle, for two reasons.

Number one, she

17 does know another juror who's in the jury box; but more
18 importantly, she knows Sherry Ragan, they, taught school
19 together.

Again, I think a person is influenced by those

20 they know as acquaintances, and I think the natural instinct
21 would be more inclined to go with her friend and acquaintance,]
22 Sherry Raga, and I think that would bias her and make her
23 unfair and unfit as a jurcr.
24

Those are all the ones I have, Judge.

25

THxJ COURT;

Well, if I strike all of those people,

1

Counsel has also asked to excuse for cause Glen Gottfredson

2

for the reasons stated,

I have a feeling from Mr. Gottfredsoj

3 that he feels "he can be fair and impartial; in fact, he feels
4

that he has counseled people with drinking problems.

He

5 didn't seem to have any distaste for someone that drinks, but
6 he did feel it was morally wrong, but said that he could be
7 fair and impartial.

So, l f n going to deny the motion to

8 excuse hixa for cause.
9

And I'n also going to deny the motion to excuse for

10 cause or objection to those jurors Claudia Vance and Lonnie
11 Schaeffer.
U

The Court did not have any feeling or opinion that)

they could not be totally independent and exercise their own

13 judgment without deferring to the other because they happen
14 to work at the same place.
15

And let's see, Counsel?

16

IIJR. ZAGLR:

Ho. 11, Ann Gearle,

17

TIIL COURT:

You objected to her, and v/ould you

18 restate your reason for that one?
19

fill. ZAGhR:

First, being acquainted with and

20 knowing and working with the prosecutor.
21

2E5S COURT:

22 kaotion to strike her.

Oh, yes .„ The Court will deny your
I felt that was a fairly tenuous

23 Relationship, they just knew each other as teachers soine ten
24 Wears

ago, and they didn't seen t o — I asked her specifically

25 B.f she would tend to favor the State because of having known
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1

it was at the area of 6800 South and 6 8 — S R - 6 8 .

2

6800 ITorth and 6 8 , SR 6 8 .

3

Q

What city would that be closest to?

*

A

It would be west of Lehi.

5
6
7

excuse m e ,

It's in the county area,

but it would be about four miles west of Lehi.
Q

Okay.

When you say J.t's in the county area,

you're referring to Utah County?

8

A

That's correct.

9

Q

All right.

10

A

My duties as the sergeant was to supervise the

n

What were your duties on that occasion?

proceedings of my team, to insure safety in the area as far

12 as is related to the flow of traffic, and also the officers
13 in their interaction with those people who were stopped.
14

Q

Okay.

Did you have occasion to observe the

15 defendant's vehicle on this date?
16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Okay.

I did.
And could you describe when and where you

18 first saw his vehicle?
19 J

A

It was a red pickup f> I think about a 1 9 6 — o r 19 —

20 what was i t — ' 6 7 red Chevy pickup.

It was headed northbound

21 on Highway 6 8 , SR-68, they call it.
22

Q

And did he enter the roadblock area?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And what did you do upon his entering that area?

25

A

He was headed northbound on that road and cane to

He did.
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1
2
3
4
5

KR. ZAG^R:

Objection, your Honor.

record, I'd like to make an objection that we would make a
continuing objection for the ease of the Court for any other
evidence that's brought in subsequent to the roadblock on
our—based on our underlying motion.

6

Till] COURT:

7

You may proceed.

8
9

10
11

Just for the

Q

£11 right.

(By Ms. Ragan)

Overruled.

What did you observe about the

I defendant?
A

At that point in time, he rolled down his window

and I started a conversation with him.

I asked him if I

12

| could check his driver's license and recristration.

13

I observed the defendant, sitting at the table there in the

14

'blue shirt, as the driver of this vehicle.

I

He started to

15

converse with me, he stated he did not have his driver's

16

license with him.

17

I was—had the occasion to get right close to the door, and

18

could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath.

19

I also observed that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy.

20

At that point in time, there was other traffic

As he was checking a few other things out,

21

approaching.

22

was over at the other side of the road, to come to me, and

23

to start to check out this individual, and I made a verbal

24

statement to him that I think ve have a problem here, and at

25

that time, I asked the driver to pull to the side of the road,

I motioned to Officer—-or Deputy Beeder, who

ii.

1
2

Til*, COURT:

Do you have the—well, it

has to be a certified transcript of the tape*

3
4

All right.

i-IR. ZAGER:

I requested one,.

Let me show your

Honor what I've received.

5

This is the tape I received front the Court.

6

THi: COURT:

Okay.

I understand that, but in order

7

to try to impeach his testimony, you have to have a certified

8

copy of a transcript, transcribed from the original court

9

tape.

10

£iR.

11

THi; COURT:

12

ZAGL-R:

This is what I have.
J.'ell, I know that's what you have, but

I'm just indicating to ycu what you need to have, okay?

13

IIR. SAGL'R:

So, your Honor would not allow this in?

14

THE COURT:

No.

15

MR. 2AG.&R:

Thank you, Judge.

16
17

Q

(By Mr. Zager)

Did you observe Ilr. ITovosel break

any laws, traffic laws while approaching?

18

A

No.

19

Q

And the reason he was stopped solely was due to the

20

fact that it was a roadblock?

21

A

That's correct.

22

Q

Okay.

23
24
25

Thank you.

Now, you mentioned that when you

anproache d Ilr. Ncvosel, you smelled an odor of alcohol?
A

That's correct.

I had occasion to move right up to

the door and talk to him very, very close.
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Face-to-face.

involved and aware of the defendant in this case?
2 I

A

Yes.

I was at the check roadblock with Sergeant

3

Tracy and some other deputies at the time.

4

attention of llr. Novosel at the time when Sergeant Tracy askecji

5

me to come over and stated to me that he believed there was

6

a problem with Mr. Ilovosel, he could smell alcohol on his

7

breath, and he wanted me to check him further.

3

Q

Okay.

9

A

Ho.

10

U

Okay.

11

I was called the

Did anyone assist you in that?
I don't believe so.
Do you recall when you first saw llr. llovoselj

what you observed?
A

12

I do not recall what he was wearing.

It was a

13

warm day.

14

if he would do some field tests of such, I did recall that I

15

smelled a mild but noticeable odor of alcohol coming from

16

his breath.

17

Q

18

tests?

19

A

No

Q

Okay.

20
21

Okay.

Anything else before you performed the field

Would you just describe what is the purpose

| of having them perform some field tests?

22 |
23

I do recall that from talking to him, asking hin

A

It's an early basic recognition.

It's another point|

, of fact in intoxication level, distinguishable by a person

24 I that's been trained to recognize that the person is under

25 the influence to a degree incapable that they can safely
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1 described that you smelled a mild odor of alcohol on his
2 breath?
3
4
5
6

A

I didn't approach the vehicle.

I approached

llr. Uovosel.
Q

When you approached rir. Novosel, was he still in

the vehicle?

7

A

IJo.

8

Q

And you cane up to llr. 1-Tovosel, and what happened?

He was out.

9 Did you ask hin a question or something along those lines?
10

A

I asked h i n — I don't recall what questions a year

11 and a half ago, I probably said, what were you doing, where
12 have you been, something like that.

I could snell the

13 alcohol, nild, on his breath, hitting ne in the face.
14

U

At that tine, you smelled what you've described

15 as a nild odor of alcohol?
16

A

Uh huh (affirmative),.

17

Q

Is it true that someone who drinks more can have a

18 stronger odor of alcohol than someone who hasn't drank as
19 much; is that possible?
20

A

Ko.

I wouldn't describe it that way.

I would

21 describe in what they've drank.
22

Q

Okay.

23

A

Hild is something of the beer fashion, when you

24 get into the other things that are r e a l — t h e whiskeys and
25 stuff are a lot stronger, you can smell the alcohol easier,

-26.

1

A

I've never attended then.

I've been around the

2 area.
3
Okay.
C
4 up there?

Is there a lot of dust and dirt and sand

5

The races are in the sand.

6

A

Yeah.

C

And on a hot day, when ycu sweat, and the dust and

7 the sand blowing, is it possible that someone's eyes could
8 become irritated and Lccorre rcduened, uithout drinking
9 alcohol?
10

;

Possibly.

11

r

irhen you first approached Mr. —v-jll, let me ask you

12 this:

Af ter you did—you spoke with Ilr. Xovosel initially,

13 when you first iret with hi*:; was hie speech slurred in any
14 way?
15

A

No.

16

r

Did he answer appropriately to the questions that

17 you asked hiiu?
18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

Yes.

21

c

And he was in fact quite conversant with you?

22

A

Yeah.

He was talkative.

23

C

Okay.

And was he polite and courteous?

i

Yes.

G

Before you even began the first field test, just

24
25

_

So,

his responses were prompt?

2J2

«

1 from your brief encounter with I!r. Hovosel, did you then
2 form the opinion that M r , Ilovosel was intoxicated?
3
4

A

So.

I concluded at .that time that I could smell

alcohol on his breath; I did not conclude that he was

5 intoxicated,
6

Q

And you realize there's nothing against the law

7 about drinking and driving, per s e , if you haven't exceeded
8 the legal limit or —
9
10

As explained by the Code, yeah.
'J

S o , there w a s nothing, no problem with the fact

11 that he merely snelled of alcohol?
12

A

So.

13

C:

Okay.

Then you required I!r. Ilovosel to perform

14 sore field tests?
15
16

A

That's correct.

r

Okay,

Z

!Tow, you stated that you studied over at

17 POST, isn't it true that POST teaches basically three
18 standardised field 'sobriety tests?
19

A

The Highway Patrol uses those tests.

20

Q

Ohay.

21

A

Through the Department of Public Safety.

It's one

22 of their ways o f — t h e y hand out a little pamphlet that they
23 go b y , they ask their officers to stay, you know, if they
24 can, by thc^e tests.
25

Q

And the hand-slap test isn't one of those that i s —

OQ

1
2
3
4

as fast as he could?
A

I tell them to go to a speed that is comfortable,

and he can go as fast as he likes, yeah.
Q

So, when someone is trying to go as fast as they

5

can, they really don't realize how fast they can go until

6

they go that fast and make a mistake and realize that that

7

was too fast for them to go; is that correct?

8

A

Could be.

9

U

So he started the test, and did he go pretty

10
11
12

quickly in the beginning, that you recall?
A

He speeded up, yeah, and got to a point where he

was double slapping.

13

y

And he started over again.

14

A

Uh huh (affirmative).

15

Q

And did he finally complete the test?

16

A

Yeah.

17

\2

Okay.

Did you give him instructions, or I think

18 we've talked about it; is it true you gave him instructions
19

on how to perform the test?

20

A

That's correct.

21

U

Okay.

22
23
24
25

What was his ability to follow the

instructions?
A

lie easily understood what I was explaining to him

and he verbalized without problems.
w

So, his ability to follow the instructions was
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1
2
3

good?
A

Uh huh (affirmative)..

Q

Okay.

Typically, someone's who has had too much

4
to drink, and often your clue into this is that you look for
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

someone who can't follow the instructions as a clue to
intoxication?
A

That is one of the clues.

If they're totally

drunk, totally intoxicated to a point where they're, you
know, slobbering drunk, which everyone suspects people to be,
of course, they're going to have problems with understanding
the test.
Q

But that wasn't the case here?

A

No.

Q

Excuse me for the question.

He was not a sLobbering drunk.
His problem wasn't one

in following instructions or not, he did that good; is that
correct?
A

Yeah.

Q

There is a portion on your report on a subject's

ability to follow the instructions, can y o u — y o u didn't fill
that portion out, did you?
A

No.

Q

After Mr. Ncvosel performed and completed the hand-

slap test, did you form an opinion then as to whether you
thought he was intoxicated?
A

I try not to form my opinion until all the test

10?

1
2

Q

S o , out of those ten p o i n t s , K r . Novosel

I would have one point?

3

A

4
5

Okay.

W e l l , two.

On the walking do™n the line to remove

himself out of the plane of the straight line, that would be
J another point; so there would be two.
Q

Okay.

Let's say that Mr. Novosel scored two

points on this; isn't it true that the POST manual says that
8

if someone scored more than tv/o points, they failed the

9

test?

10

I

11

A

Yeah.

That's one

Q

Okay.

S o , on this heel-toe test, at least,

of the clues,

12

| llr. Novosel, it would be safe to say, he passed this test?

13

I

14

I what you say there w a s .

A

Yeah.

Pe scored two out of the ten, if that's

15

ii

S o , he passed the heel-toe test?

16

A

He had tho^e errors, but he would have passed,

17

| yeah.

18

0

19

Okay,

Cut despite the fict that he passed the

test, you arrested hin for DUI?

20

I

21

I in the Court today, but which cave me a better indication.

22

I

MR. ZAOLR:

Objection.

3 I

THL COURT:

W e l l , I think it's been alluded to by

2

A

Yeah.

I had another test that was not included

And move to strike,

2

* J both parties, *nd I won't comment further on it,

25

I

y

(By llr. Zager)

And the heel-toe test was the
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1

It's sort—ascertained by the Highway Patrol, they require

2 a maximum of two clues or more, greater than that to presume
3 under a certain influence. That's only based on their
4 opinion at that time.
5

Q

Okay.

But to restate your testimony earlier, he

6 did, in fact, in your opinion, pass the heel-toe test?
7

A

Yeah,

He did okay.

8

Kli.

9

TIIU COURT:

You can step down, Officer.

10

MS. RAGV-I:

Call Officer Gary Taylor.

11

THE COURT:

Step down, Officer Beeder.

12

Could you ask him to come in, please?

13

OFFICER BEED"CR:

14

THE COURT:

15 under oath.

ZAGJL!?.:

TTo further questions.

Yeah,

Trooper Taylor, you've been placed

Would you please take the witness stand?

Thank

16 you.
17

MR. 2AGi-R:

Your Honor, for brevity, might I just

18 consult with the prosecutor for a moment?
19

TIlii COURT:

In the name of brevity, you can consult

20 all you want.
21

(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was had

22 between counsel.)
23

TIP- COURT:

You may proceed, Counsel.

24

M'J. RAGA1I:

Po you mind if I state that?

25

MR. ZAGKR:

If you can do so.

i

n o

I

1

Q

2

—concerning what Mr. IJovosel claims to have had

to drink, in fact, he says he had six beers.

Now, without

3 putting you through any calculations because I know we've
4

already done that outside the courtroom, so I'll spare you

5

I that; is it your conclusion that it would not be possible

6

I to tell what iir. Novosel's blood alcohol was at the time

7
8

he was driving unless the breath test was performed at the
I time he was actually driving?

9

10

A

To know what he was right at that time, that's

I correct.

11

Q

Okay,

So, this .11, which was taken some 45

12

| minutes later is not indicative of what llr. Novosel's blood

13

I alcohol was at the time he was driving; is that correct?

14

I

15

A

That should be correct.

Q

bo, in fact, if Iir. Novosel had consumed a large

16

portion of his alcohol at a time close to driving, is it

17

possible that that alcohol was not into his system at the

18

time he was driving, yet was in his system to a larger

1

9 I extent at the tirae that he took the breath test 45 minutes

20
21 J

later?
A

That's possible.

U

Is it also possible under that scenario that

23 I Mr. IJovosel may have been under the legal limit at the time
24 he was driving?
25

A

Could have been.

Ilobody knows, would know.
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1

TROOrER TAYLOR:

Thank you,

2

THII COURT;

3

(Whereupon, the jury was excused from the

4

Thank you.

courtroom.)

5

MR. SAGi-R;

Your Honor, at this tine, I v/ould move

6

for a motion for a directed verdict on the charge.

7

my motion is well taken and v/ould present it as follows:

8

J

9

I rhink

First, let me make my motion on the second part of
the DUI statute, v/hich says that a person is guilty of a DUI

10

if he is under the influence of any alcohol or drug or the

11

combined influence of alcohol or drug, to a degree which

12

renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to

13

| drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle in this

14

I State.

15

'

I have not heard evidence that says Ilr. ITovosel was

16

unable to safely Irive his vehicle; in fact, the evidence has

17

been to the contrary. Lach Officer who has seen Ilr. Kovosel

18

drive, actually it was just the one officer Tracy, has

19

stated that he saw hr. L'ovosei approach the roadblock, he

20

seemed to slow up and hesitate, but he violated no traffic

21

| laws and drove in a normal and safe manner.

I think that goe^

22

right to the heart of the statute, I don't think there's been

23

any evidence to ^resent that ilr. ilovosel, number one, drove

24

his vehicle in an unsafe manner and if he did, i t was a

25

result of alcohol.

So, I would move that your Honor take
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

that issue from the jury and move the Court to direct a
verdict acquitting 2ir. Novosel on that portion of the charge.
On the other part, the .08, it's a little more
difficult, but I would also move the Court to dismiss that
count, that portion of the DUI charge, because it's the
State's burden of proof, to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, and Officer Baylor's testimony that it is possible
that Mr. Novosel was under that legal limit at the time he

9 was driving, and that's the State's witness, that it would
10 not be possible for the jury to come back with a guilty
11 verdict, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Ilr. Novosel
12 was over the .08 when driving, when considering the fact that
13 Mr. Taylor says it's possible that he was under.

And in

14 view of the other evidence, when Mr. Novosel passes the
15 heel-toe test, drives fine, speech is good, and all the
16 other things we've discussed in Court today, a jury would not
17 be proper in coming back with a guilty verdict, and I'd ask
18 the Court to dismiss —
19
20
21
22
23

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. ZAG£R:

— d i r e c t a verdict.

TH£ COUST:

Thank you, Counsel.

prosecutor respond.
ll&.

RAGAN:

I don't agree.

24 say any more than that.
25

I'll let the

I don't think I need to

I think there's enough evidence

certainly for them to find him guilty if they believe the

•A4d-

witnesses, J u d g e ,
Officer Taylor said it is also possible for him to
have been

higher than the . 1 1 , so w e think that's

significant, and I ask you not t o — I don't think there is
5

J such a thing as a directed verdict in criminal cases.

I

suppose he's asking for a dismissal, and I would ask the
Court to dt*ny that motion.
8

I

9
1

TILC COUR'J:

Okay.

I'll let you respond, M r . — m y

mind is starting to go.

0 J

MR. "SAGuR:

Zager.

11

THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

12

MR. ZAGLR:

I'm sorry, Judge.

13

T E L COURT;

M r . Sager.

14

MR. ZAGER:

Your Honor, only to reiterate that

15

there's been absolutely no evidence at all that Ilr. Ilovosel

16

did not safely drive his vehicle; in fact, the evidence has

17

18
19

| been that he has safely and prudently drove his vehicle.
THE COURT:

All right.

W e l l , that certainly isn't

the only standard or the only evidence that the jury or the

20 I Court should or would look at.

Officer Tracy testified that

21 J he had had numerous experience with people under the
influence of alcohol and gave his opinion that M r . Novosel
23 I was intoxicated at the time, based upon the totality of the
24 circumstances.

And that was before Officer Beeder did

25 anything, performed the field sobriety tests or had him take
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1

the intoxilyzer test.

2

3

I think both officers had a very limited opportunity
to observe any driving at all, and so I think that's a matter
that lies within the sound discretion of the jury.

5

With respect to the other alternative, whether he

6

was over .03 or not, it's undisputed at this point in tine,

7

J anyway, that 45 minutes after being stopped, there was a

8 test result of .11; given the statute of 41- 6-44.5, it talks
9

about the giving of the test and if it was within two h o u r s —

10 well, it says if the chemical test was taken more than two
11 hours after the alleged driving or actual physical control,
12 the test is admissible as evidence of the person's blood or
13 breath alcohol content at the tine of the alleged operating
14

or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall

15 determine what weight is g i v e n — w h a t weight is given to the
16

result of the test.

17

two hours, then there's almost a presumption, it doesn't use

18

the word presumption, but it's certainly stronger if it was

19 within two hours.

Which seems

to imply if it was within

That again i s , I think, lies within the

20 sound discretion of the jury to make that determination.
21

The Court determines that there is, at this point,

22 sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury on both
23 alternative theories, so the Court will deny the motion to
24 dismiss.
25

Do counsel want a brief recess before we proceed
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1

don't like real heavy barbequed foods, they don't settle

2

right; I had a couple sandwiches and I did have beers with

3
4
5
6

ny sandwiches.
Q

Okay. About what time period are we talking about

before you left?
A

I don't know.

Well, it's around this tine of day,

7

it was dinner tine, it nay have been later, because the only

8

tiro I really pay attention to a cloc^ is the one that wakes

9

ne up in the morning.

10

And I'd say between, say, 5:00, 5:45,

somewhere around there, approximately, }ust--

11

Q

About how long did it take you to eat your sand-

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

wiches?
A

It doesn't take iue long.

I probably ate my

sancwiches and beers, 1 was hot and thirsty and hungry, and
I'd say maybe, oh, ten-15 minutes, if that.
U

I don't know,

£o you know how ir.any i^eers you ha a within that

half hour period before you got in your vehicle with Jeff?
A

I had one before I ate, and tnen I had one with

each sandwich to help wash it down, ^ut then the wife give
me a list to go get some soda pop and chips for the kids
to spend the night with us, and I nev^r did make it.
u

So, it was three beers then that you had within,

23

say, a half hour or so?
24
25

A
Q

x^ah.
When the officer asked you what you had to drink

• * * 1

1

8 8 1 3 0 3 , b o t h c o u n s e l are p r e s e n t as is the defendant and

2

jury m e m b e r s have returned ana are now seated in the jury box

3

after notifying our c l e r k w h o acts as bailiff t o — t h a t

4

had arrived at a v e r d i c t .

5
6

the jury xoraaan; is tnat correct?

i1liu

10

COUACI.4:

i'li^ CutL-Cx.

And have y o u arrivea at a v e r d i c t ?

A n a you've given

cAat verdict" form to

tne cier^; is chat c o r r e c t ?

12

i^c. ilCi/uLL^l,;

13

'ilLu COujtv'i:

14

they

And let's s e e , is it lir..'.Mcmullen who is acting as

8

11

the

Viiat is correct.

A n a the reeora will show the clerk has

handeu it to :::e.

15

1 w o u l d at tnis tiue tnen ask .J:. :*ovosel, if y o u

16

w o u l d , sir, to btand, w i t n your attorney, and ±'11 read the

17

v e r a i c t to y o u .

18

;<Ci/ the jurors in the aixrw c a s e , find tne defendant^,

19

u o s e p h llovojei, guilty or ^ u l .

20

3ury r o r e n a n .

21
22

A t your r e q u e s t , C o u n s e l , X w o u l d be glad to p o l l
the jury rneiabers to see it this is still their v e r d i c t .

23
24

25

^i^neu oy n r . i^cliuilen, the

IiK.

ZAGJUU:

Thank y o u , J u d g e .

i wouia lir.e to

know that.

THLc CUUKi;

Yes, s i r .

201

'Jhanfc y o u .

P l e a s e be

1 seated th en.
2

Marjean Sawyer, was this and is this still your

3 verdict?
4

MRS. SAWYLK:

5

THii COURT:

6

And Claudia Vance, was this and is this still your

Yes.

Thank you.

7 verdict?
8

I-^\5. VAKCL:

9

TlLu C O U K T :

10

Ye s.
xhank you.

And LaRene Peay, was this and is this still your

11 verdict?
12

(Inaudible)

13

THii COURT:

14

And iir. Hckullen, was tnis and is this still your

Thank you.

15 verdict?
16

hR. licMULLiill: Yes.

17

THE COURT:

Thank you very much, folks.

18 tine, the Court v/ill discharge you.

At this

ThanK you for a

19 marvelous job, we appreciate your service.

I hone that you

20 feel—-you might be a little bit tired at this point, but
21 that you feel satisfied that you've performed your jury
i

22 service well, and you've done a fine job, and we, in behalf
23 of the counsel and the parties, I know we really appreciate
24 it, so we 111 let you go at this time.
25

Also, we have a one-day service rule in this

2£2

l

MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
Attorney for Defendant
3167 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone (801) 964-6100

!R R2 :Q3

IN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT, CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH,

:
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
TO DISMISS

:
:
:

JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL,

Case No. 1-7437-87

Defendant.
ooOoo——
COMES NOW defendant, JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL, by and through
his attorney of record, Mitchel Zager, and hereby moves this
Honorable Court to suppress all evidence obtained after the
unlawful stop at the roadblock herein, or, in the alternative, to
dismiss, based on the case law cited, surrounding

factual

circumstances, and upon oral argument at time of this motion.
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about August 1, 1987, Saturday, at 6:24 PM,

defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was stopped at a roadblock at SR-68
at 6800 North, Lehi, Utah.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and

incorporated herein by reference is the DUI report form.
2.

On August 1, 1987, JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was arrested

and charged with a DUI.
3.

(See Exhibit "A".)

That the officers at the roadblock observed no
1
EXHIBIT "B"

traffic or equipment violations nor any suspicious activity prior
to the stop.
4.

(See Exhibit "A".)
There is no record of the time the roadblock was

set up and dismantled.

Attached hereto as Exhibit

"B" and

incorporated by reference herein is plaintiff's response to
defendant's second set of discovery, answer No. 1.
5.

There was no record of the names of the officers at

the roadblock at the time of the defendant's arrest.

(See

Exhibit "B" attached hereto, answer No. 2.)
6.

There were no advertisements nor media notice of

the roadblock herein.
7.

(See Exhibit "B", answer No. 3.)

There was no record of the number of persons

stopped at the roadblock herein.

(See Exhibit "B"

answer T*o.

7.)
8.

There was no record of the number of DUI arrests at

the roadblock herein.
9.

(See Exhibit "B", answer No. 8.)

There was no record of the number of other arrests

at the roadblock herein.
10.

(See Exhibit "B", answer No. 9.)

There was no record

of the number of other

citations given at the roadblock herein.

(See Exhibit "B",

answer No. 10.)
11.

The purpose

for this roadblock was to check

licenses, registrations and alcohol violators.

(See Exhibit n B H ,

answer No. 15.)
12.

There was no record of any specific directions,

guidelines, or instructions given to each officer concernincr * H ~
2

law enforcement and the roadblock.
"C" and

incorporated

Attached hereto as Exhibit

by reference

herein are plaintiff's

responses to defendant's third set of discovery, answer No. 1.
13.

No empirical data has been provided showing that

roadblocks are more effective in dealing with the drunk driving
problem than traditional roving patrols.

(See Exhibit

H

CM,

answer No. 2 and Exhibit "B", answer No. 13.)
14.

On August 1, 1987, Sand Drag Races were being held

at the near proximity of the roadblock.
15.

Defendant NOVOSEL at the time of step did not have

his license on him, was not cited for that offense.

(See Exhibit

"A" attached hereto.)
16.

No complaint, reports, nor extra patrol requests

nor deputy's personal knowledge of the need for the roadblock as
concerns alcohol violators have been provided.
II.
DUI ROADBLOCKS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The C o u r t of C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s of Oklahoma h e l d :
T h a t t h e F o u r t h Amendment p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t an
u n r e a s o n a b l e s e i z u r e of t h e p e r s o n i s v i o l a t e d by t h e
u s e of a t e m p o r a r y r o a d b l o c k a s a means t o s t o p a l l
t r a f f i c (or t r a f f i c a t e s t a b l i s h e d i n t e r v a l s ) without
any a r t i c u l a b l e f a c t s giving r i s e to a reasonable
s u s p i c i o n f o r t h e s t o p , f o r t h e p u r p o s e of s e e k i n g o u t
c r i m i n a l DUI o f f e n d e r s .
S t a t e v . S m i t h , 674 P . 2d,
5 6 2 , 565 ( O k l . CR 1984)
The S m i t h c o u r t
means a p p r o a c h
public
referred

stated

[ i n an a t t e m p t

highways]

draw[s]

that

the

"end

justifies

t o remove DUI o f f e n d e r s

dangerously

to as a p o l i c e s t a t e . "
3

Id,

at

close
564.

to

what

the

from t h e
may b e

The Smith

court

recognized that "a basicr tenet of American jurisprudence is that
government^Bannbtr assume criminal conduct in effectuating a stop
such as the one presented herein."

Id.

The court in Smith recognized the potential abuse of
establishing checkpoints to seek out criminals in their analogy
concerning the logical extension of roadblocks leading to the
establishment of checkpoints in every shopping center, to stop
shoppers to check for purchase receipts.

Jd.

In Smith, as in

the case at hand, there was "no statutory authority which would
support, directly or indirectly, the State's contention that it
has the power to establish checkpoints to inspect all motorists
to discern if they are intoxicated."

Jd, at 565.

All of the

evidence obtained at the roadblock in Smith was suppressed.
The Utah District Court of Weber County also suppressed
evidence obtained at a DUI roadblock.

State v. ffolley, a copy of

which is attached hereto for the court's convenience.

In Holley,

the Utah District Court adopted the reasoning in Smith, ruling
that the roadblock in question was unconstitutional, despite
evidence that the roadblock in question was professionally and
safely conducted.

Id.

In our case, the State admits that the purpose of the
roadblock was to seek out criminal DUI offenders.
Facts, No.11.)

(Statement of

The cases cited above require a finding that such

roadblocks are unconstitutional per se in their blatant violation
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

4

III.
THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
VALIDITY OF A POLICE ROADBLOCK.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently stated the
well-established rule that:
. . . to justify the search or seizure of a motor
vehicle, absent probable cause or even a reasonable
suspicion that a criminal offense is being committed,
the State must prove that its conduct significantly
advances the public interest in a manner that outweighs the accompanying intrusion on individual rights.
It must further prove that no less intrusive means are
available to accomplish the Statefs goal. State v.
Koppel, 499 A. 2nd, 977, 981 (N.H., 1985)
The Supreme Court of Arizona recognized that roadblock
stops of motor vehicles absent a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity

is subject

to a balancing

constitutionality of the roadblock.

test to determine the

Ekstrom v. State of Arizona,

663 P. 2d, 992, 994 (Ariz. 1983)

In Ekstrom, the court was

required to balance "the intrusion caused by the police conduct
on an individual's fourth amendment interests . . . against . . .
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."

Id.

The State

* n Ekstrom, as in the present case, failed to disclose statistics
concerning the extent of the problem of drunk drivers, nor
statistics supporting the effectiveness of roadblocks versus
traditional roving patrols acting upon reasonable suspicion in
dealing with the drunk driving problem.
in Ekstromf

JEd, at 996.

The facts

as in our case, show that officers are trained to

detect drunk drivers on the road based on observations and that
experienced officers become highly skilled at detecting drunk
drivers

by observing

driving
5

patterns

and

can, without

roadblocks, detect many drunk drivers.

IdL.

The court in Ekstrom

concluded that "if there is an adequate method of enforcing the
drunk driving statute, there is no pressing need for the use of
an intrusive roadblock device."

The Ekstrom court further stated

that without empirical data, balancing the needs of the State
against the individual rights cannot be conducted.

The Ekstrom

court upheld the Justice of the Peace's ruling that the roadblock
was unconstitutional and in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and suppressed all the evidence
obtained therein.

Id.

The case law cited requires the State to prove that the
public interest in apprehending drunk drivers outweighs the
intrusion entailed by a roadblock stop.

Without empirical data,

the State cannot meet its burden of demonstrating that the public
interest is significantly advanced by establishing roadblocks.
This court cannot perform the balancing test and the roadblock
must be declared unconstitutional.
IV.
A ROADBLOCK I S UNCONSTITUTIONAL WHERE THE INTRUSION
ON THE INDIVIDUAL OUTWEIGHS THE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS.
The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t

stated:

E x a 4 p t vibAre
there is at least articulable
and
r e a s o n a b l e ^ s u s p i c i o n t h a t ) a m o t o r i s t i s uAlicezjsed
or
t l m t a n j f u t o m o h f i l e i s nojc r e g i s t e r e d , o r / t h ^ r x / e i t h e r
tHe v e h i c l e o r / a n o c c u p a n t i s o c h e r w i s p sutr}ect§ t o
s e i z u r e ffor v i o l a t i o n o f l a w , s t r o p p i n g 4 n au£onud^ile
a i d d e t a i n i n g tlie d r i v e r i n order t o checj^/his dpivfer's
l i c e n s e Wnd t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n o f W h e
automobile\are
u n r e a s o n a b l e u n d e r t h e F o u r t h Amendment.
Delaware v .
P r o u s e , 99 S . C t . 1 3 9 1 , 1 3 9 3 ( 1 9 7 3 )
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The Prouse court further stated:

|fegifi£. The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion of
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Id.
As stated above, the State cannot meet its burden
because it has no records to support the degree that roadblocks
promote governmental interests; and, therefore, a balancing of
the interests is impossible herein.

Nonetheless for purposes of

argument, numerous factors considered by courts in applying the
balancing test are:

The amount of discretion the officer at the

roadblock maintained; whether prior notices of the location and
purpose of the roadblock were given to motorists to prevent
surprise; whether the roadblock was a permanent roadblock or a
temporary roadblock; the purpose of the roadblock; the time of
day of the roadblock; and whether less intrusive methods were
available to accomplish the alleged State's interests.
v. State of Arizona, (supra);

Ekstrom

State v. Koppel, (supra); State v.

Holley, (supra); State v. Smith, (supra);

Delaware v. Prouse,

(supra) ; State v. Marchand, 706 P. 2d, 225 (Wash. 1985); and
State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W. 2d, 392, (S.D. 1976)

Each of the

courts recognized that the intrusion of the roadblock was too
great and thereby held the roadblock unconstitutional.
In Ekstrom, "Motorists were taken by surprise, not
having

had prior

checkpoints."

notice

of

location

Ekstrom at 996.
7

and

purpose

of the

In Koppel« it was found that an unpublicized temporary
drunk driving roadblock set up at night:
. . produces a substantially greater amount of
"subjective intrusion—a generation of concern or even
fright on the part of lawful travellers, . . . "
(Martinez/Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083)
than does a permanent roadblock whose existence and
purpose are coamon knowledge. Koppel at 983.
In the present case, there was no advertising nor prior
media notice of the temporary roadblock which was set up in the
evening hours.

The officers at the roadblock were not given

specific guidelines nor direction regarding the procedures to be
followed at the roadblock.

As in Ekstrom, as in the present

case, officers
. . . were not told what to do if a vehicle turned
around to avoid the roadblock.
They were not told
whether to inspect visible cans or bottles. They were
not told whether to shine a flashlight in each vehicle
that was stopped after dark.
They were not told
whether to smell inside each vehicle tof detect the
smell of alcohol. Ekstrom at 993.
Even though vehicles in Ekstrom were detained

from 30 to 40

seconds to five minutes, the court held that the degree of
intrusion in light of the surprise and fright occasioned on the
motorists was a significant and substantial intrusion.

Id.

In Smith, the court stated:
The roadblocks in the present case could well act, and
most likely did act, as a total surprise to those
passing through.
The subjective intrusion, for
example, fear and apprehension, potentially imposed
upon the individual innocent of misconduct is simply
too great. Smith at 564 (supra)
In Ekstrom. the court found in that roadblock, "the
grave danger that such discretion might be abused by the officer
8

in the field, a fact which caused the court in United States v.
Prouse, (supra), much concern."

Ekstrom at 996.

In the case at hand,

the roadblock, which was a

temporary roadblock, was set up at dusk without prior notice to
motorists approaching.

Officers were left with considerable

discretion as to how to operate the roadblock.

As stated, the

purpose of this roadblock was to check for drunk drivers.

This

roadblock is unconstitutional for those important defects stated
hereinabove.

As held consistently throughout the cases cited,

there are less intrusive methods are available to apprehend drunk
drivers; namely, traditional roving patrols where officers are
trained and skilled to observe driving patterns to apprehend
drunk drivers.

As stated in Prouse, the United States Supreme

Court found that:

*

. . . the foremost method of enforcing .traffic and
vehicle safety regulations, it must be recalled, is
acting upon observed violations. Vehicles stopped for
traffic violations occur countless times each day; and
on these occasions licenses and registration papers are
subject to inspection and drivers without them will be
ascertained. Furthermore, drivers without licenses are
presumably the less safe drivers whose propensities may
well exhibit themselves. Absent some empirical data to
the contrary, it must be assumed that finding an
unlicensed driver among those who commit traffic
violations is a much more likely event than finding an
unlicensed driver by choosing randomly from the entire
universe of drivers. Prouse at 1399 (supra)
In the conclusion by the Supreme Court of Marchand, the

court stated:
We draw this conclusion from the rationale of Prouse:
"Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental
intrusion every time he entered an automobile, his
security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be
seriously circumcised."
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V.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, a s c i t e d above, r u l e d a s a matter of
law thidt r o a d b l o c k s x h i c h

s t o p motorists without

s u s p i c i o n of

criminal a c t i v i t y f o r t h e purpose of c h e c k i n g on p o s s i b l e a l c o h o l
violators
Fourth

is

unconstitutional

and

Fourteenth

p e r s e and i n v i o l a t i o n of

Amendments

to

the

United

the

States

Constitution.
Other c o u r t s
l i m i t e d circumstances

in the cases c i t e d herein s t a t e

t h e roadblock may be proper f i n d i n g

t h e S t a t e has t h e burden of p r o v i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
the roadblock i n q u e s t i o n .
test

whereby

the

that

in

that

v a l i d i t y of

The c o u r t s have r e q u i r e d a balancing

governmental

interests

furthered

by

the

roadblock outweigh t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s Fourth Amendment r i g h t t o be
f r e e from unreasonable s e a r c h and s e i z u r e s .

The* c o u r t s , i n t h e s e

i n s t a n c e s , have r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e S t a t e p r o v i d e e m p i r i c a l data t o
prove

that

effective

the

roadblock

means f o r

is

enforcing

the

least

intrusive

and most

the drunk d r i v i n g s t a t u t e s .

In

t h i s c a s e , the record i s s i l e n t a s t h e S t a t e f a i l s t o produce any
statistics
roadblock.

to

prove

the

degree

of

effectiveness

of

this

Furthermore, i t i s c l e a r t h a t more e f f e c t i v e and l e s s

i n t r u s i v e means for e n f o r c i n g drunk d r i v i n g laws a r e a v a i l a b l e t o
the State in their
observations

of

traditional

driving

p r o c e d u r e s of

patterns

of

suspected

v i o l a t o r s while proceeding as a roving p a t r o l .
failed

skilled

officers1

drunk

The S t a t e ,

driving
having

t o produce s u c h e m p i r i c a l d a t a s u p p o r t i n g t h a t prong of
10

the balancing test cannot prove that the roadblock herein was
constitutional.
Even assuming for argument sake that the State can show
that the roadblock is the most effective and least intrusive
means of enforcing the DUI statute, this particular roadblock is
unquestionably unconstitutional.

The roadblock was set up in the

evening hours for a purpose of checking for DUI violators.

There

wac no advance notice given of this roadblock; therefore,
motorists approaching the roadblock were subject to considerable
surprise and fright, causing a substantial and significant
intrusion in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The officers at

the roadblock were not given specific procedural directions in
implementing the roadblock.

Substantial discretion was left to

each officer at the roadblock.

The intrusion on motorists, was,

therefore, subject to abuse.

There is no statutory authority

which authorizes the establishment of this roadblock.

For these

reasons, the operation of this roadblock is unconstitutional.
Defendant respectfully moves this Honorable Court to
grant defendant's motion to suppress all the evidence obtained at
the roadblock and, in the alternative, to dismiss all charges
against this defendant with prejudice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 6

day of November, 1987.

• ffitchel Zage£/ //
Attorney for Defendant
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
Attorney for Defendant
3167 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 34118
Telephone (801) 964-6100
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT - AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH,

:
:
:
:
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
TO DISMISS
Case No. 1-7437-87

JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL,
Defendant.
ooOoo
COMES NOW d e f e n d a n t ,
his

attorney

Honorable

of

Court

record,
to

questioning

NOVOSEL,

or,

prejudice.

in

the

This

Mitchel

suppress

unlawful

and

JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL, by arid t h r o u g h

all

is

and h e r e b y moves

evidence

detention

alternative,

motion

Zager,

of

to

based

obtained

defendant,

dismiss

all

on

case

the

after

the

JOSEPH A.
charges
law

with

cited,

s u r r o u n d i n g f a c t u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and upon o r a l argument a t
of h e a r i n g of t h i s

this

time

motion.
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On or about August 4, 1987, defendant JOSEPH A.

NOVOSEL was stopped at a roadblock at SR-68, at 6800 North, Lehi,
Utah.

Attached hereto as Exhibit

reference herein is the DUI Report.
1
EXHIBIT "C"

"A" and incorporated by

2.

Following the road'block stop, defendant JOSEPH A.

NOVOSEL was detained improperly and was required to perform a
field sobriety test.
3.

The sole basis for requiring a field sobriety test

was the officers impression that he smelled a mild odor of
alcohol and observed reddened eyes.

II.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
WERE VIOLATED BY THE UNJUSTIFIED STOP AND CONTINUED
DETENTION OF DEFENDANT; THEREFORE, ALL THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED
THEREBY MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
The United States Supreme Court landmark case of Terry
v. Ohio stated that, "It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment
governs 'seizures1 of the person . . .".

Tgrry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, at 16 (1967).
* n Terry, the Court continued, "It must be recognized
that whenever

a police

officer accosts an individual

and

restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized1 that person."
Id.
The Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Gibbons, citing
the Terry case, stated:
A holding of the person, no matter how minor, is a
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
even though no arrest has occurred.
State v. Gibbons,
535 P. 2d, 561 (1975), citing Terry at 16.
The Gibbons court reviewed a long line of cases concerning
unjustified stops and stated:
2

The distinguishing feature in this case is that the
defendant was signalled by a police patrol car to pull
over and stop; her compliance with this signal cannot
be viewed as her own uncoerced choice. She was, in a
real sense, compelled to submit to the officer's
presence; she was detained. Gibbons, at 564.
The Gibbons court, quoting State v. Evans, stated:
Restraint of liberty can arise either by means of
physical force or show of authority, . . . and the
constraint of volition is equally real whether it
arises by implication from the color of authority of
the police or from their express command.
Id., citing
State v. Evans, 517 P. 2d, 1225, 1223 (1974), Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19.
In the case at hand, defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was
stopped at a roadblock.

He was then confronted by Sergeant

Tracy, whose role it was, according to his testimony at a prior
hearing, to "stand back and supervise."
testified

Sergeant Tracy further

at Defendant's Motion to Suppress based upon an

improper roadblock that th^re was nothing unusual about Mr.
NOVOSEL f s

driving

pattern when approaching

the roadblock.

Sergeant Tracy went on to state that Mr. NOVOSEL slowed down in a
most typical fashion.

He further stated affirmatively that Mr.

NOVOSEL drove in a proper and reasonable fashion, stayed within
his lane, and the only reason he was stopped was because there
was a roadblock.

Deputy Sheriff Beeder, who also testified at

defendant's previous Motion to Suppress, stated that Mr. NOVOSEL
was further detained after the initial stop for approximately
seven (7) minutes and was required to perform a field sobriety
test.

Deputy Sheriff Beeder states that he did not observe the

NOVOSEL vehicle as it approached the roadblock.
Beeder testified

Deputy Sheriff

that Sergeant Tracy asked him to assist on
3

NOVOSEL when Sergeant Tracy stated, "Would you come over and
assist with this subject and do some field tests?
he f s been drinking.
tests.11

I can tell

I can smell it, and would you do field

In the police report attached hereto as Exhibit "A",

defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL ! s breath is described by Officer
Beeder

as mild.

It

is also noted

that Mr. NOVOSEL was

communicative when the officer noted very talkative in the DUI
report form.

There was nothing in the report to indicate that

Mr. NOVOSEL1s speech was anything but normal.

At the time of the

stop, defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was seated in his vehicle.
Defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was, at that time, compelled to
submit to the officers' presence and was not free to leave until
the officers 1

investigation^and

interrogation were completed.

Clearly defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL was seized within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
within

the meaning

of Article

I, Section

14, of the Utah

Constitution, and his freedom to leave the scene was restrained.
In the Gibbons matter cited earlier, the facts reveal
that there the officer had personal observation of the vehicle
bearing out-of-state license plates which was patrolling the back
streets, which appeared to be confused or unfamiliar with the
city.

The officer in Gibbons felt that there might be something

wrong at the late hour of the occurrence.

Gibbons,^at 562.

In Gibbons, as in the present case, the defendant had
violated no traffic laws in the presence of the officer.

In the

pffesent case, there is no law against drinking and driving;
4

therefore, the mere presence of' an odor of alcohol described as
mild in this case along with observation of red eyes, standing
alone, would not form a sufficient basis for continued detention
and seizure of the defendant and the requiring of the performance
of field sobriety

tests * by the defendant.

The officer

in

Gibbons, as in the case at hand, had no reasonable suspicion of a
connection between the defendant and an unlawful activity.
In State

v. Kimmel, the court held

in a similar

situation:
. that the objective facts known to the officer
were not sufficient to form a "reasonable suspicion"
that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, and
thus the investigatory stop was not justified.
State
v. Kimmel, 728 P 2d, 894 (Or. 1986).
The facts in Kimmel reveal an unusual driving pattern when
defendant

failed to hit his brakes or otherwise react to a

pedestrian that walked near defendant's path of travel.

The

officer in Kimmel pulled alongside defendant's vehicle and noted
that defendant had a flushed

face and watery eyes.

On that

basis, the officer suspected defendant was under the influence of
intoxicants and stopped him.

The Kimmel court recognized the

rule that:

In reviewing the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of a stop, we must
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e s t a n d a r d of a r e a s o n a b l e
s u s p i c i o n has been met by the o b j e c t i v e t e s t of
observable facts known to the officer at the time of
the stop. Id, at 895.
The c o u r t
instinct

went on to s t a t e ,

and e x p e r i e n c e

reasonable suspicion."

cannot

Id, at 896.
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" . . . an

officer's

form the e n t i r e b a s i s

for

The Kimmel court then held

that the facts were insufficient

for the officer to form a

reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while intoxicated, and that the evidence available to the officer was
inconclusive at best.
In the case at bar, defendant NOVOSEL exhibited no
suspicious

driving pattern and, in fact, according

officers drove in a lawful and normal manner.

to the

The mere smell of

a mild odor of alcohol and reddened eyes is, at best, inconclusive and would clearly not form a reasonable suspicion that
defendant was intoxicated.
and requiring defendant

The further detention of defendant

to perform

field sobriety tests was

unlawful and violative of both the federal and Utah Constitutions
and as such all evidence of the field tests and evidence obtained
thereafter must be suppressed.
* n Terry, the court held:
The exclusionary rule was adopted to effectuate the
Fourth Amendment right of all citizens to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
"unreasonable searches and seizures"
. ...
Under
this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding
against
the
victim
of
the
illegal
search and
seizure . . . .
The rule's prime purpose is to deter
future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate
the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .
^United
States xr.
^Pavelski. 789 F. 2dr 485, at 488 (1986)
gRgsn^^tfr^ki ^ the

c o u r t pointed

out

that>^ Jl An

^investigating officer ! s subjective good faith, inarticulate
hunches, and indioa-te and unparticularized suspicion may not~ form
the basis for an investigatory stop,-"

Pavelski at 489.

In the present case, as stated, the officers1 hunch or
6

suspicion

that defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL might have been

driving under the influence of alcohol would still fail to
support a continued detention of defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL1s
vehicle since the officers had not observed criminal activity,
and that any hunch of criminal activity was unsupported by the
facts surrounding this detention.
drove his car according

Defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL

to law, did not exhibit signs of an

intoxicated person, but simply had a mild odor of alcohol which
would not support the continued detention and seizure of this
defendant•
III.
THERE DID NOT EXIST PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
DEFENDANT JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL; AND THEREFORE,
ALL EVIDENCE RECEIVED AFTER THE ARREST MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
Following the field tests performed by defendant JOSEPH
A. NOVOSEL, there did not exist sufficient probable cause to
believe defendant NOVOSEL was intoxicated; and as such, the
arrest

was unlawful.

Defendant

NOVOSEL was required and

compelled to take three (3) field sobriety tests on a public road
in the presence of numerous police officers present at the road
block.

The first test was the Gaze Nystagmus test which we have

questioned as to its reliability in a separate motion before this
court.
test.

The following tests were a hand-slap and heel-to-toe
Neither of the two tests given would give probable cause

to arrest Mr. NOVOSEL.

The hand-slap test is not one found in

the Post Standardized Field Sobriety Testing manual; however, the
heel-to-toe test is one taught by Post.
7

The heel-to-toe test, in

fact, demonstrates that Mr. NOVOSEL was not intoxicated since Mr.
NOVOSEL passed that test according to the Post manual.

(Cover

page and page 40 of the Post Standardized Field Sobriety Testing
manual is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".)

Furthermore, even if

probable cause was found to arrest Mr. NOVOSEL, the chemical test
performed "on Mr. NOVOSEL was in violation of statute since the
admonition concerning

the consequences of taking the chemical

test were not explained to Mr. NOVOSEL.

(See police report, X,

of Exhibit "A" previously attached hereto.)

IV.
CONCLUSION
The justification for a seizure of the defendant has
not been met in this case.
had

made

no personal

Conversely, the officers involved

observations of criminal activity as

concerns defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL.

Neither of the officers

had not observed any traffic violations committed by defendant
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL.

The sole basis for the stop was the road-

block previously questioned by this defendant and the sole basis
for the continued detention and seizure of defendant JOSEPH A.
NOVOSEL is that the officers claimed to have smelled a mild odor
of alcohol on defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL.
sufficient

basis to reasonably

There was not a

suspect defendant JOSEPH A.

NOVOSEL had violated the DUI statute in Utah.

As stated, in all

other respects Mr. NOVOSEL properly operated his vehicle and
properly conducted himself at all times.
8

Officer

Beeder did not have, according

to law, a

reasonable suspicion that defendant NOVOSEL was intoxicated; and
therefore, the further detention of Mr. NOVOSEL and requirement
to perform field sobriety tests were unlawful and violative of
both the Utah and Federal Constitutions.
Furthermore, the officer did not have probable cause
following the field sobriety tests to believe defendant NOVOSEL
was intoxicated; and therefore, the arrest was unlawful and all
evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed.
Additionally, the chemical
NOVOSEL

was

in violation

test given to defendant

of statute since

the

admonition

concerning the chemical tests and its results was not read to
defendant NOVOSEL by Officer Beeder.
Based upon the case law authority, facts and oral
argument at time of the hearing, we hereby respectfully move this
Honorable Court to suppress all of the evidence that was obtained
as a result of the unjustified continued seizure and detention of
defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /0**day of February, 1989.

MifCHEL ZAGEJ^/
Attorney at Law
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/ *-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the /& ^ day of February, 1989, I
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
to Sherrie Ragan, Utah County Prosecutor, 37 East Center, Suite
200, Provo, Utah 84601.
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fJMMONS AN
AND CITATION
VSUMMONS
STATE OF UTAH
t COUNTY OF

UTPr}\

ISSUING
ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY
NAME

CASE

UY- CJZ Jft&Zrt,
(Last)

"(Ciiyj

'

57 4 Apfr/yns

1 CITY OF
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN:

T Expires

A
223d££L Weight
Eyes
S~9
Vehicle Make
Vehicle Type

ID

OCATED AT

S.

peeves/Mr

loae-

rtJZtiof
<-(.TbH

A-

State

Vehicle Year

Color

£ei)

\

1-2I-S7\

Zip

(Slate)

SVeuH

Motorcycle
Yes (No)

Restriction Code
State

Vehicle License No

67,

Accident
Yes -g£>

Expires

uTOirection of Travel
N ££> E W

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING
^ U T A H CODE
ON THE

/

D COUNTY CODE
DAY OF

5£&f

LOCATION .
tot less than (5) nor more than (14) days after issuance
Df this citation

0O8

-{Middle)

Z-euS
Sex

H*ght,

CH&j-

»URT OF

D 08183,

^ni i OffAt £ QiT

License Class

Oliver License No

m.

(First)

AOORESS

C I T A T I U N INU

iry-

NO

fi-UG-

19 P?

&%6Q/v

Pu f

VIOLATION(S)

D CITY CODE NO .

*-/J

MILITARY TIME

m

d>* VQ 4*
/ &£?>

. MILE POST NO

ALCOHOL.

FOR COURT USE ONLY
DATE OF CONVICTION

WITHOUT ADMIT^NG GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN

FINE

-SUSPENDED.

SIGNATURE _

JAIL.

.SUSPENDED,

DISPOSITION
D Plea Guilty

D No Contest

D Trial Guilty

D Not Guilty

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT
ACCORDING TO U W ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE
NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER
COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19, UCA
OFFICER

.BADGE NO

Final Charge
COMPLAINANT

DATE OF CITATION

Prosecuting Agency .
OLD

DATE SENT TO OLD
COURT COPY ONE

EXHIBIT "A,f

DOCKET NO

SOMPLAIfT
TAKEN BY

i

I

mo

UTAH COUNTY SHRRIFF DEPT.

"PORT

imq

TIME RECDi

PERSON REI

TIME OtSP.

VICTIM

PHONS

LOCATION OF INCIDENT

TIME COMPLETED

DISPATCHER

•^PrfoB

nrg

RAO*

PERSON

§11

Q

O

a

N2^57218

AOORESS

TELEPHONE

AOORESS

TELEPHONE

€±
Ncwnse.l

? r t i 7 H p < ^ 1 & qnrSfsffifiEOft/
OFFICER ASSIGNED

\-Keer\p,

Jp^Ph h

OETAJLS:

0>

\y^

-REPORTED

nmriif.

TIME ARRVD

UJA1

HOW

^
Ll&feREPORT OF OFFICER S FINDINGS: _

T^tVCvj
Pfrft&s. \\er t o t e

rb>

^ N ^

-Ti2fl.cy p i n

flflpfrrk

frothy tt£r>

*Vt>

ftrtuwn

O/Vi

Sp.Al-

f/>tn./i

«SA»U^(.

QLC

e/t*o

inAnnuivfi*

r>fl.\rt^K>c efyu,\6{t

~~!AUG
OFFICER

C-J^PL.

TIME
. COMPLETED

0550

fXM.
. Q P.M.

DATE .

im

S-3-f»7

USE OTHER SIDE F MORE SPACE NEEDED

$$* m

/ • - • -

• • • •

l

- -

oncmM • rotwAto NMMOIATIIY TO T M MOTOR VCUKU DIVISION or nw STATI TAX COMMISSION

REPORT

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH

FORM KUO RCV. 9 1 2

VEHICLE I M P O U N D REffORT

NO.233610 i

A

DA,E 0T-OI-S7 Sff

12 05 03

STYLE

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION
OR SERIAL NUMBER

If-ft?™*

YEAR OF L I C
YEAR OF T A B -

UfAff-

NO

a/DV99

_ VEHICLE REMOVED F R O M .

STORED AT
REASON
FOR
IMPOUND

LICENSE
.TAB. N O .

UL-2J8&

YARD
NO.

ADDRESS
| IMPROPER REGIS IRA I ION INO UIAH REGISTRAIION EXPIRED RtGlSIRAlION

THEFT

^

ABANDONED
POSSIBLE THEFT

OUI

OfHER
SEE
REMARKS

OWNER
VEHICLE
DRIVER

ADDRESS

ACCESSORIES
SSORltf \A

.*

RADIO
* - *~

I
-|

SPOT UGH I

HUB CAPS

|

JX

S~7***

ERRORS

\ ^

13 (fo^'*D
I r^

X

r-*^

HEA1ER
_P

I V

PROPERTY
I N VEHICLE

DAMAGE

^ / ^ c J b ^ My*sr.^&*p*jGZ ftprJnt) c^Vad
TXTrfrrCy'
Ar,Mrv (Ar.CjQ.

OFFICER'S S I G N A T U R E .
REMARKS

USE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS COPY FOR OFFICERS PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT.

m
<^*>

01 HER
SEE
REMARKS | I
I REMARKS

Atntebm

\
II

UTAH DANK NOTE CO. 801/3221071

DUI
UMMONS AND CITATION

ISSUING
ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY
NAME

STATE OF UTAH
(COUNTY OF
UTfr}}

AObfiESS

CITY OF

Driver License No.

S-7-

D 08183

(First)

(Last)

CITATION NO.

Middle)

DOB

A"

7-3MT

(State)

(Cittf

zip

2</0Qti
Expires

State

Restriction Code

Motorcycle
Yes (Go)

UT.

-JZenQ^O/O

SATED AT

UT. ra- sH-e£)FF

57 <? AOfi/MfS
License Class

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN:
JRTOF

CASE
NO.

TQ

3 -

pLgy^/M/T

Height.

Weight

Eyes

MUZ.

Vehicle Type

Vehicle Make

tiJliwr
itT/M

Vehicle Year

Color

£ML

Expires

State

LL- 3/gfr

T

U

I

Acadent
Yes
-©

Direction of Travel

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING:
^3-UTAH CODE • COUNTY CODE D CITY CODE NO.:
^ ^
ON THE

/

DAY OF

3£&r

LOCATION .
I less than (5) nor more than (14) days after issuance
his citation.

Vehicle License No.

G1

Cljieu.
I04&-

Sex

VIOLATION(S):

Du f

A-UG'«

19 9?

&$6o/v.

MILITARY TIME

N £pE W
^

%
H

/ & 3 3

. MILE POST NO.

ALCOHOL.

FOR COURT USE ONLY
ITE OF CONVICTION

WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN

^E

.SUSPENDED

SIGNATURE

iL.

SUSPENDED

SPOSITION

*

Plea Guilty

D No Contest

Trial Guilty

G Not Guilty

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE
NAMED DEFENDANT DIO COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER
COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19. U OA.
.BADGE NO.

OFFICER
nal Charge

lit

rosecuting Agency.
LD

COURT COPY ONE

h.

DATE OF OIATION
(STATIC

COMPLAINANT

DATE SENT TO OLD

DOCKET NO.

READ CAREFULLY
This citation is not an information and will not be used as an information without your consent If an information is
filed you will be provided a copy by the court You MUST appear in court on or before the time set in this citation.
IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR
YOUR ARREST.

NOTICE OF INTEtfT TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE: You are hereby notified that thirty-one (31) days from the date of
this notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of Utah will be suspended pursuant to Section 41-2-19.6
UCA for a period of ninety (90) days thereafter, or for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if this is the second
or subsequent occurrence of this offense OR if a peace officer has indicated you have refused to submit to a
chemical test to determine the alcohol or drug content of your breath, blood or urine, you are hereby notified
that thirty-one (31) days from the date of this notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of
Utah will be revoked pursuant to 41-6-44-10 UCA for a period of one (1) year. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REQUEST A HEARING ON THIS SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION. The hearing is not for purposes of granting you
a limited license but only to determine whether or not your license should be suspended or revoked.
The department will NOT contact you further regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in writing. Your WRITTEN REQUEST must be sent WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the date of arrest to the DRIVER UCENSE DIVISION at
4501 South 2700 West, P.O. Box 30560, Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560. Upon your timely written request for a
hearing you will be notified of a time and place to appear. If you fail to appear or request a hearing, your driver license
suspension or revocation will become effective as indicated above. The administrative hearing is civil in nature and
does not satisfy the requirement for you to appear in court.

• ••• -""•»*->|D ?, 0 8 1 8 3
• • * •••• • '.'.I.' ci'"!.: 1 - 3'5«"I»MV;'?I
.I ._ I "-.• ..-.i'.;.:p' \:«r;t { i . ' w n s vi.

DUI REPORT FORM
/.

CASE IDENTIFICATION:
Data f - t ' ? * l
Day SfirT-

Ar.cAdent

A/ 0

Cnse #

*1~
£7.3/6

Tima Prepared

Subject's Name
Tc&epi). A
/Voun.trLAddress
57? A/PAntiS
in/nvrtie
Place of Emploftnftnt
^/Z/wrr<- -SCHOOL
Address
'"
Home Telephone Number
5"6/- 7*7*7/
Work Telephone Number
Z_.
D.O.B.
1-2*1" 5" 1
Driver License f Zp-Stosi
: Time of Arrest
lMr-.^
'
Place of Arrest
L&rti
atniy •
Charges
Q u i ^ •'••^:
Arresting Officer
<* fitaJltAS • •
Assisting Officers
' - ' - - i ':,TVCM v c \ r Arresting Agency
U £Sa
II.

III.

VEHICLE
Year
<W
License # and state
Registered Owner

w

Color
JLSf?
UTA^.
<1£ ?,/?&>
<Tog^?tf- NOI)OS&L.

Make
^V-fgV.
Disposition
Address

0". T(l(W

• •_
Model \ 7/ZuctLltt,)&{).
-Ve/bbS*
^/9-rr^ -e *

':* ' ! '" : ' ""' •' ' " r ' ' ' ' • Ai "' ;t " r '"'"'
Tele. # :'-'"' "' "' ' : """ Age/DOB''

WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically)
Name
Address

1.

tiCSo-

•'

•

•

•

ura.li

'

'••»•

*
•

.;•'••'

'•

••

.
.'.-.r-.

I'-::T ,\.'•? Vi'tii'itF

2.
1

'.';., J '. '• V \*

4.

•i

..••.;..

&

.

.... ...; ..,
"~"

*..«•, .r t .Via i-; en i

*

~~

IV. ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL:
• : • ' • ;
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle are:

f/»A-^

V. DRIVINd PATTERN:
'
' *' %
, . v . C ! , C ". _ , _
At
Subject's location when first observed
" SfL &g :
(±%oo A3. *
— The facts observed regarding driving pattern:
STcp/p&p on fcofip BLQCML
OWL*] PgfLCf/u
^

Ito
*

Qg-\4^CL^

AT

H^i^^.

'teP

^TOP"

~

~

<£>/V
-

"— '

#6%ifV/7

6& ^/g«

~

•
—
* **

#-

t
•

.

.

*

i

.

.

i

i

i

1

1

* > •

i . i

:

VI.

PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT:

VII.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:' • ^
Odor of alcoholic hevftrann '•' *SMIx.O
Speech
UKTt^f TtK)£A.T'0 G

''AuT
•

BalanrB' ' '
' fttoA
•
' '
Signs'* or complaints Df injury' or i l l n e s s " "

'Other physical characteristics

. 1 .

,

.

~.—u_.—:

Pt^t)/
/

;
'•
- ^
'/OpytiL?^

ACo^/7

b-ffoT

/V6Ti<zA&L<b^

^'-^••^

E)/(sr±

V.A-.K.

Z

v

-"'t"c*-

). V x t x<K-

> .r

v.cs^

»

SOBRIETY TESTS: (Desc" <* subject's actions)
flrC
MfinJQ

45°

A/vdiL& r^r'P Birr-oHis.

Si/Ml-

£g/gg7rarf)

UNS^6QTY\

O/O - S c j y f i / v £ .

PUILSUI'T^
ST#rZT<?/?

*OetZ-

Tlt?iC&.

SccaJ^O

a
4.

Ae&L To -roe'~

**>x

5LUA\/I=:0

/£Ais&rfK*rtrt-w05

US/*L/£//O<S-

s/v<~e-

7-0

5.
Were tests demonstrated by officer?
IX.

\j&S -

SEARCHES
A,
Vehicle:
Was subject's vehicle searched?
When?

Aj£jU*X

V g 5 Where?

Evidence

Person who performed the search
B.

Subject's ability to follow instructions,

Subject:
Was subject's person searched? Y&&When?
MM^Jr
Evidence Found
Person who performed the search

<Sce7u-**

^^7^ -

^ - T/gfl*V
Where?

% v

'' $Cbn*4^ r a <" fksuJh^

CHEMICAL TESTS:
Mr. or Mrs.
IUPVQS>S^
% d 0 y o u understand that you are under arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any)
'
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test io determine the alcohol (drug) content of your blood. I
request that you take a
f^\JLattk
. test.
(bIood(6re^urine)
•

The following admonition was^aiven bv me to the subject before the chemical test was administered: " ' ' }'
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood
alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may,
result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate, a motorryehicla

What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response:

Did subject submit to a chemical test?
Y g & '
Test Administered by
C
fiyU^oL
Time:
« l^t^T
Results
• 11 ^

Serial No. of test machine:

y ^z^3^

Type of test
f/UT0</Li2&/Z
Where?
* A-Ffjff *
Was.subject notified of results?
\ •V

aq^ooi/37

. % (if the subject refuses the test, read the following) »
•

The following admonition was given by me to the subject:
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you refuse, your license or
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited driver's license.
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer
a test at your own expense, in addition to the one I have requested you to submit to, so long as it does,
not delay the test or tests requested by me. Upon your request, I will make available to you the results
of the test if you take it.

(if the subject claims th
3

<ght to remain silent or the right to co

$e\, read the following:) *

The following admonition was given by me to the subject:
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which
is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you
the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure.
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test.
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver'% license can be revoked for one year with
no provision for a limited license.

XI.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
Was subject advised of the following rights? ysS»
When
APT&L tt>n-o+. T V ^ T *
By Whom? ? C (hjuiAjL^
Where?
A Pf 0.
(S 1. You have the right to remain silent. m
*S 2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
<S 3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to .representfyou before
h
any questioning, if you wish one.
••
y 4. If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answering questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning.
Were the following waiver questions asked?

5JL

1. Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you?
Response
VFS/

2. JHaving these rights in mind, do you wish fo talk to us now?
Response
y^^ •

INTERVIEW:
.
,
,
_
Were you operating a vehicle?
\/g"^> 4- LuflS
Where were you going?
<?1TV/Ler / AJ C&tf-i
ryVl&V&THC^—
What street or highway were you on?
K£Q UJ60O
(LOftrO
Direction of travel?
NQfcTHWhere did you start from?
Dffl-T (lofr/O
a rv fat-rXjfO*
When?
What time is it now?
f?',3(*
What is today's date?
/? HC » I - £ 7
Day of week?
(Actual time
Date
Day
S&T
What city or county are you in now?
^ o ^ tfft£» f^ftp^-**
What were you doing duringHhe last three hours?
fLfVp/vG
C U » T H . hC/iO?,
A.
/3erv>i- OF) a .
_L T
s L
Have you been drinking?
!What?
fieVTl—
'
How much?
Q> PfiCML.
y
Where?
SfrnO
Qdf&£> •
;
When did you have your first drink?
f,o&
.Last drink?
/4ouH- A6-o
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now?
pty^u'T F ^ e i u&tr
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind?
(What kind? Get sample)
ZZ
When did you have the last dose?
Are you ill?
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:)
Were you involved in an accident today?
^0
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident?
If so, what?
~
When?

A5p/7Z//° *
f

<T-

6THER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS:

XIII.

ATTACHED DOCUMENTS:
I have attached the following documents to this report:
1. 0 Copy of citation/temporary license / V O T O/M \^inv\
2. • Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit •?
3. D Traffic accident report
4. D Other documents (specify)

I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer and that the information contained above in this report form and attached
documents is true and correct to my knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my
duties. It is my belief the subject was in violation of section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time, and place specified in this report.

CPfogJlu;
Signature of Peace Officer
Law Enforcement Agency:

&T-

nate-

Time:

>-3'*7

'

Cn. $ffis€.iFFz
Q42-I

The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to:
Driver License Division •
4501 South 2700 West
P.O. Box 30560
Salt Like City, Utah 84130-0560

3-7-

*-/-*?

S7*i9>

iDSerptf' 1

NAME OF DEFENDANT:
ADDRESS OF DEFENDANT:

A•

•

/VO(/oSe~L/YY) 1 DO

ALB

um.

S-yo)l

1'dU'St

DATE OF BIRTH:
OFFENSE(S):

Q (A i

TYPE OF VEHICLE:

in

. C Uer// •

LOCATION OF INCIDENT:
DATE OF OFFENSE:

AU.C

BLOOD:

TlPMCkL

£ fZ. £ 8
f-

SPEED:

hZoo

A?

97

ARRESTING OFFICER/COMPLAINANT:
AGENCY/ADDRESS:

t/i-L'Mi

AiCOI-lOL.

ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS - BREATH:_

COURT:

APPROVED

CASE NUMBER

DATE

C P

fl?g??ft7l

U C- S O
pPTRaC<ftU

f LmZftlVT

6-/lO V<=

VICTIM:
VICTIM'S ADDRESS:
WITNESSES:

SUMMONS?

No.

Address

Name
1.
2.

Yes.

UCSD

ZT- -W-$C\J

UCSd

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
I C E USE ONLY

, CHECKED
J COMPUTER
PRINTOUT

,—, WITNESSES

J—J

I 1 NAMES 6

I I FORM i

ADDRESS

P. CAUSE
D AFFIDAVIT
D
FILLED OUT
BY OFFICER
(if appli c a b l e j

P,T, or*r,

Burroughs

^f^N^ w

v_..w... D . .-/rCMI INCORPORATED

...C

.1—

INTOXILYZER TEST RECORD

INTOXILYZER

INTOXILYZER PRINT CODE

X ALCOHOL IN tLOOO

OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST - D

SUBJECT

JgS^fH-10oO&fgt.

INSTRUMENT

» cm~6s\\?>'7

DATE

$-1-81

LOCATION

(ASA)

TIME

/gag_

•

A - A I R BLANK
B - BREATH

•

C - CALIBRATORCSimulator)
OBSERVED SUBJECT
FOR REQUIRED OBSERVATION
PERIOD AND FOLLOWED
CHECK LIST

•

AP/7?

C &ej&£L>^

OPERATOR

rj ' i -.-

•
•

OPERATOR'S INITIAL,

xh i.
V$ 2.

POWER SWITCH ON, READY LIGH^ON.

^ " 5.

•

CONNECT BREATH TUBE TO PUMP TUBE. INSERT TEST RECORD
CARD.

3

PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 2,

A* 0

PRESS ^ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 3.
DISCONNECT PUMP TUBE FROM BREATH TUBE]* EXTEND BREATH
TUBE AND INSERT MOUTHPIECE. - TAKE BREATH*SAMPLE.
(NOTE TIME) LIGHT 4 WILL COME ON AFTER SAMPLE IS

TAKEN,

(heSciLTS-

fcA- REMOVE
6.

*H1

MOUTHPIECE, HCUSE BREATH TUBE AND CONNECT TO
PUMP TUBE, PRESS ADVANCE WAIT FOR LIGHT 5. REMOVE TEST
RECORD CARD.

POWER SWITCH OFF.

HPT-I8 (P-732)

P-rfD-

A* 0 D
i

I N T O X I L Y Z E R LOCATION

<?^-0OM37

i

I N T O X I L Y Z E R SERIAL N U M B E R

0

•

DATE
^

I

SUBJECTS

lfJiT

N A M

JL_jjmn

•Hos

TIME riRST OBSERVEO

TIME TEST STARTED,

OPERATOR

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND/OR REMARKS

STANDARDIZED FIELD
SQ3RIETY TESTING
S T U D E N T MANUAL

5 f\T7\ fl

UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL
POST
EXHIBIT "B"

WALK AND TURN 7HS7
CAN'T KEEP 8ALANCE WHILE LISTENING TO INSTRUCTING.
STARTS BEFORE INSTRUCTIONS
FINISHED.
STOPS WALKING TO STEADY SELF.
DOES NOT TOUCH HEEL TO IGS.
LOSES BALANCE WHILE WALING
(STEPS OFF THE L\z
USES ARMS FOR SALAnCE (?MSzS
ARMS MORE THAN SIX INCHES.)

As the suspect performs the
v a r i o u s ^ t e s t s , t h i s portion of
the f i e l d note t a k i n g guide rnay
be used to keep score by placing
a n*rk r e x t to the part of the
t e s t the subject f a i l e d tc do
adequately.
I t would then be
put with your other r.ot2S f o r
future
reference.

LOSES SAIAHCE WHILE TURNING.
TURNS INCORRECTLY.
.NCC = REC7 NUMBER OF STEPS.
CANNOT CO TEST [ S ^ S OFF UNE 2
3R VQ->.zT:VzSy
TOTAL SCORE JCECSICN K

DOB

OTHER 7ES~S:
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MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968
Attorney for Defendant
3167 West 4700 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118
Telephone (801) 964-6100
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT - AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION IN LIMINE
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 1-7437-87
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL,
Defendant.
ooOoo
COMES NOW Mitchel Zager, Attorney for defendant, JOSEPH
A. NOVOSEL, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to suppress all
mention and results of the GAZE NYSTAGMUS

test performed on

defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL at the tim& of the field sobriety
test.
I.
THE HORIZONTAL,GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST IS VIOLATIVE OF DUE
PROCESS AND MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
In People v. Vega, the court held that it should be
reversible error for the "trial court to permit testimony from
the officer that befsed upon the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus
test, a person had a blood alcohol concentration of .1 % or
more.

To allow such testimony will raise a number of due

EXHIBIT "D'

process problems, since the arresting officer!s reading of
the test results cannot be verified or duplicated by an independent party.

People v. Vega, 496 N.E. (P 2d) 501 (1986).

The court went on to state:
Moreover, because the test has a wide margin of error,
it cannot begin to satisfy a conscientious court that
testimony as to the test results are sufficiently
probative so as to overcome the obvious prejudicial
impact of such evidence.
Relatively more accurate
chemical testing devices are readily available, and
should be preferred when compared to the dubious
Horizontal Gaze* Nvstaamus field test.
II.
GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST IS NOT SCIENTIFICALLY ACCEPTABLE
AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED INTO EVIDENCE
SAT TIME OF TRIAL.
The NHTSA researchers

found that 50-60* of normal

individuals will exhibit nystagmus when the eyes are deviated
to the lateral extreme, when in fact no alcohol consumption
has taken place.

Toqlia Electronystagmography:

Technical

Aspects and Atlas, (1976).
III.
GAZE NYSTAGMUS TESTS SHOULD NOT BE ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE SINCE DEPUTY Beeder IS NOT AN EXPERT
IN NYSTAGMUS.
When questioned about Gaze Nystagmus, Officer Beeder
was unfamiliar with
nystagmus.

the various

factors that can cause

This precludes defendant from effective cross-

examination since Officer Beeder can merely testify as to his
opinion as to the

correlation

between

what

he

alleaes he

observed and the result that defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL
demonstrated alcohol consumption which put his blood alcohol
at a .10 * alcohol.
IV.
CONCLUSION
There are several arguments which dictate against
permitting

the Gaze Nystagmus Test to be admitted

evidence.

The test is one that is not accepted

into

in the

scientific community and is subject to many variables some of
which will indicate alcohol consumption and some of which
won't.

The test is, therefore, not reliable, and

its

prejudicial effect far outweighs its probative value.
Secondly,
Nystagmus

Test

the

is not

officer

who

qualified

conducted

the

nor an expert

Gaze

in the

scientific procedure and is unfamiliar with various variables
that will affect the jlest, some of which have nothing to do
with the consumption of alcohol.

The defendant is deprived

of his due process in cross-examining this witness since the
witness can only testify as to his opinion as to the result
and is not an expert and cannot testify as to the various
factors which affect nystagmus.
Furthermore, defendant JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL $s

deprived

of due process because the test results cannot be verified or
duplicated by an independent party.
Based upon the case law

3

authority,

facts

and

oral

argument at time of the hearing, we hereby respectfully move
this Honorable Court to suppress all of the evidence of the
Gaze Nystagmus Test.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JD ^

day of February,

1989.

/5feS icJt,
MITCHEL ZAGE&
Attorney at Law

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the /£)r" day of February, 1989, I
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregc^ng to Sherrie Ragan, Utah County Prosecutor, 37 East
Center, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601.
'^z^dU
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STEVEN B. KILLPACK
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
37 East Center St., Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 373-0136
IN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

REPLY TO SECOND
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

vs.
JOSPEH A. NOVOSEL,

Case No.

1-7437-87

Defendant.

COMES NOW plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through its
attorney, Carlyle K. Bryson, and in answer to defendant's Second
Request For Discovery provides the following information:

1.

The exact time the roadblock was established and

dismantled are not matters of record with the Utah County
Sheriff's Office.
2.

The names of all officers attending the roadblock are

not matters of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office.
Officers attending a roadblock may change as demands elsewhere
may require.

Total number of officers was never less than

requred by office policy.
3.

See Attachment #1.

No advanced advertisement or media notice was given of

this roadblock.
4.

The roadblock was located at the intersection of State

Road 68 and 6800 North in the county area south-west of Lehi,
Utah.
EXHIBIT

,,E
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5.

See attachment #1.

6.

See attachment #1.

7.

The number of persons stopped at the roadblock is not a

matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office.
8.

The number of "DUI" arrests made at the roadblock is not

a matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office.
9.

The number and nature of other arrests at the roadblock

are not matters of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office.
10.

The number and nature of other citations issued at the

roadblock are not matters of record with the Utah County
Sheriff's Office.
11.

This question is repetitive of question #18.

See

question #18 answer.
12.

The average length of time each motorist at this

roadblock was stopped is not a matter of record with the Utah
County Sheriff's Office.

It is estimated that the average length

of time a motorist is stopped at roadblocks conducted by the Utah
County Sheriff's Office is between 30 seconds and one minute
unless a violation is detected.
13.

This question is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its

present form.
14.

The roadblock was authorized by Lt. David Lamph, Utah

County Sheriff's Office pursuant to attachment #1.
15.

The purpose of this roadblock was to check for Driver's

License, Registration and alcohol violations.
16•

Part one of this question related to "a description of

the number of police vehicles" is ambiguous and cannot be

answered in its present form.

The location of police vehicles at

the time of the roadblock varied as vehicles arrived and
departed.
17.

Ail officers attending the roadblock were uniformed

officers.

The total number of officers at the roadblock varied

depending on various factors.

That part of this question related

to "their positions* is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its
present form.
18.

Orange reflective signs approximately 16 inches square

were placed on large highway cones in the middle of the roadway.
Signs read "Sheriff's Roadblock Ahead"
burning emergency flares.

and were placed with

Emergency lights on patrol vehicles

were left in operation.
DATED this 7th day of October, 1987.

KAY B R Y S O N / 7 X
Deputy Utah County Attorney

STEVEN B. KILLPACK
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
37 East Center St., Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 373-0136
IN THE FIRST PRECINCT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

REPLY TO THIRD
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

vs.
JOSEPH A. NOVOSEL,

Case No.

1-7437-87

Defendant.

COMES NOW plaintiff, State of Utah, by and through its
attorney, Carlyle K. Bryson, and in answer to defendant's Third
Request For Discovery provides the following information:
1.

Defendant has previously been provided with a written

copy of the Utah County Sheriff's policy on roadblocks.

Oral

statements given to each officer attending this roadblock are not
a matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's Office.
2.

This question is ambiguous and cannot be answered in its

present form.
3.

The exact distance between the roadblock and warning

signs are not a matter of record with the Utah County Sheriff's
Office.

In general, the distance between roadblock and warning

signs is determined by a number of factors including, time of
day, speed limit of the highway or roadway, traffic conditions
and highway or roadway conditions.

Roadblocks held in the area

of this roadblock, as a general rule, have warning signs placed

DVUT'Oxm

It T?*«

approximately 300 feet from the roadblock and are visible at a
distance of at least 500 Feet from the roadblock.
4.

No equipment to determine blood alcohol content was

present at the roadblock,
5.

The Senior officer present at this roadblock was

Sergeant Kerry Evans.
6.

Defendant's request is too broad and unreasonable.

DATED this 26th day of October, 1987.

CARLYLE KAY BRYSON
Deputy l#ah County Attorney

UttlfC^ryirA,-/

g t

Utah County Sheriff

^iip==£*
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OAKOTA LANE

PROVO. U T A H 84601

PHONE 374-2211

MACK HOLLEY
$h*nff

TO: Patrol Sergeants
FROM: Lt. David Lamph

DATE: October 11, 1984
RE: Roadblocks

Until such time as I am able to develop a more comprehensive
policy in this matter the following will be used.
1.

The roadblock must be for a specific purpose/ ie. drivers
license, registration/ alcohol violations,•etc.

2.

The need for the roadblock, if other than license and registration violations/ should be borne out through the use of
complaint reports/ extra patrol'requests/ or the deputy?s
personal knowledge.

3.

The' sergeant on duty must be at the roadblock to supervisehis deputies actions.

4.

if the sergeant is not on duty his designated senior patrol
deputy must be at the roadblock.

5.

Deputies do not have the, discretion to establish a nonemergency roadlbock.

6.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ » _ _ ^

There will He no less than three deputies at any non-emsrgen<
roadblock.

This number may include the sergeaiv: or senior .

_

Patrol deputy.

7.

Roadblocks will be held in a safe location/ eg. not a blind
curve.

„

Drivers of vehicles should be allowed a large amount

of reaction time and this should be in the deputies view*

#-.

2
8. The public has a right to travel the highway in safety.
When the traffic has backed up to be a sufficient irritant
to the public or a safety hazard you will direct traffic
through stopping only the obvious violators.
9. There will be an obvious escape route made at the roadblock in the event a violator "runs" the roadblock. The
escape route will be in such a location that the deputy
is not in danger.
10. Roadblocks should be established where there is enough room
for the violator to pull off the roadway.
11. Chase vehicles will be positioned to apprehend those who
\\

evade the roadblock.

\^y£Sr

N>ofc-r-'
^

'

Patrol Commander
TITLE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff,

]i
1

RULING ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

vs.
CARL CRAIG HOLLEY,

|
)

Case No.

16530

Defendant.

Having considered the evidence presented at the hearing
on

defendant's

memoranda

and

motion

to

suppress

authorities presented

and

having

considered

by both parties,

the

the
Court

rules as follows:
The issues presented were:
1.

Was

the roadblock

in question

conducted

with

the

primary purpose of detecting drinking drivers?
2.
I

If so, are such roadblocks constitutional?
find

that

the

primary

purpose

of

the

roadblock

question was to detect and apprehend drinking drivers.
leading to this conclusion are as follows:

(1)

in

The facts

An intoxilyzer

machine was present at the scene; (2) A deputy city attorney and
a deputy county attorney were present at the scene; (3) Several
cars were at the scene for the designated purpose of transporting
prisoners;

(4)

The

guidelines

used

by

the

law

officers were entitled "Roadblock D.D.I. Enforcement".

EXHIBIT "G"

enforcement

s6n Motion to Suppress
/o.
16530
In determining whether such roadblocks are legal, it is
/ecessary
against

to balance the government's law enforcement
the

Amendment

degrefe

rights.

of

intrusion

on

an

interests

individual's

Fourth

No authority has been presented on this issue

which I consider to be directly binding on the courts in Utah.
Some

courts have determined

that D.D.I,

roadblocks are

unconstitutional regardless of how they are conducted.
Smith,

674

P.2d

562

(Oklahoma

1984) f

People

v.

State v.

Bartley,

446

N.E.2d 346 (Illinois 1984).
Other

courts have

suggested

that

they

possibly may be

proper under some circumstances but were improperly conducted in
the

instant

case.

Commonwealth

v. McGeochegan,

(Mass. 1983) , State ex rel. Ekstrom

449 N.E.2d 349

v. Justice Court of State,

663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983).
In
court

State

determined

properly

v.

P.2d

il74

(Kan. 1983),

the

that D.U.I, roadblocks

were

constitutional

if

conducted

Deskins,

and

the

673

court

suggested

certain

guidelines

that would result in legal roadblocks.
In reviewing the cases from the various state courts, no
general rule has emerged.
It is clear from the evidence presented at the hearing
that

the

roadblock

in

question

was

professionally

conducted and that it would have satisfied
suggested

by the court

and

safely

the basic guidelines

in the Deskins case.

There is also no

doubt that drunk drivers are a menace to the public.

However,

fq on Motion to Suppress
4 o . 16530
/ere

is

a degree

of

intrusion

''subjected to when

passing

may

'where

be

tolerable

and

through
evidence

fear

that

roadblocks*
suggests

individuals are
Such

there

intrusions

are

no

less

intrusive but equally effective means of detecting violators,
am not persuaded

that

such less

I

intrusive means do not exist.

Therefore, I am adopting the reasoning followed by the courts in
People v. Bartley and State v. Smith in ruling that the roadblock
in question is unconstitutional.
DATED this 14th day of March, 1985.

/s/ David E. Roth
DAVID E. ROTH, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Ruling on Motion to Suppress to Richard Parmley,
Attorney for Plaintiff, 7th floor Municipal Building, Ogden, Utah
84401, and to Christopher Shaw, Attorney for Defendant, 635 25th
Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this 14th day of March, 1985.

/s/ Paula Carr
PAULA CARR, Secretary

MlTCHEL ZAGER

FILED

ATTORNEY AT LAW
gFFB^ WEST=2RF€RF5e0TH
SALT L A K E CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 1 8

MAR

TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 9 6 4 - 0 1 0 0

3587 West 4700 South
February 28, 1990

5 1990

COURT OF APPEALS

Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
RE:

Citation of Supplemental Authorities
Pursuant to Rule 24(J)
State of Utah v. Novosel, Case No. 890143-CA

Ladies and Gentlemen:
The following cases were included in Appellant's oral argument without
citation and came to the attention of Appellant after Appellant's
brief had been filed, but before decision. Appellant cites:
Pledger v. Cox, 626 P. 2d, 415, 416 (Utah, 1981). The Court
defined a trial anew from the Justice to the Second Court
"as if it originated there." Id, at 416.
In State v. Milliqan, 727 P. 2d, 213, 215 (Utah, 1986), the
Court then stated in footnote No. 2 that, "We have
jurisdiction over cases commencing in Justice Court where
the issues raised involve a constitutional issue."
And State v. Bartley, 124 Utah Advanced Reporter, 40, 42
(Utah, 1939), states:
The stopping of an automobile and the detention of its
occupants constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, . . . and must therefore be supported by
at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on
objective facts, that the occupants are involved in
criminal activity.
S t o c e ^
MITCHEL Zi
JAVBR/
Attorney at Law
MZ:z
Enc.
cc:

Charlene Barlow, Esq.
Sherrie Ragan, Esq.

I v. COX

Utah

415

Che as, Uti 626P.2d4!5

opinion. Plaintiff's prayer for attorney's
fees is denied, and the parties are to bear
their own costs.
CROCKETT,* and' HOWE, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice (concurring in
the result and dissenting):
I concur in the result, but refer to my
dissenting opinions in Despain v. Despain,
Utah, 610 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1980) and Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 619 P.2d 1372
(1980).

Ray PLEDGER, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
S. Tony COX, Director, Drivers License
Division, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 16987.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 4, 1981.

The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Maurice D. Jones, J. pro tern., upheld revocation of driver's license, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Oaks,
J., held that statutory "trial de novo" provided to review administrative revocation
of driver's license for refusal to submit to
blood test for alcohol content is a complete
retrial upon all the evidence, and upon such
complete retrial, the Drivers License Division should have the burden of proof and
the burdeji of going forward with the evidence.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
* CROCKETT, J.f concurred in this case prior to
his retirement.

1. Administrative Law and Procedure
c=>744
"De novo" means literally "anew,
afresh, a second time," and has at least two
possible interpretations when applied to judicial review of administrative action: (1) a
complete retrial upon new evidence, and (2)
a trial upon the record made before the
lower tribunal, and the meaning of "trial de
novo" in each statute is dictated by the
wording and context of the statute in which
it appears and by the nature of the administrative body, decision and procedure being
reviewed.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Automobiles c=> 144.2(4)
Statutory "trial de novo" provided to
review administrative revocation of driver's
license for refusal to submit to blood test
for alcohol content is a complete retrial
upon all the evidence, and upon such complete retrial, the Drivers License Division
should have the burden of proof and the
burden of going forward with the evidence.
U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19, 41-2-20, 41-6-44.10(b).
3. Automobiles ®=> 144.2(4)
Where review of administrative revocation of driver's license for refusal to submit
to blood test for alcohol content was faulted
by erroneous ground rule about the sequence and burden of proof, Supreme Court
would not speculate about whether the error was prejudicial but would reverse and
remand the case to district court for a new
trial.

Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, of Salt Lake Legal
Defender* Association, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Bruce M.
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
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OAKS, Justice:
The issue in this appeaf is the nature and
allocation of the burden of proof and burden of going forward with evidence in a
district court's "trial de novo" review of an
administrative revocation of a driver's
license for refusal to submit to a blood test
for alcohol content pursuant to the implied
consent statute.
After giving appellant a field sobriety
test, a Salt Lake City police officer investigating a traffic accident placed appellant
under arrest for driving under the influence
of alcohol. According to his testimony, the
officer then requested appellant to take the
breathalyzer test, and appellant refused.
Following a hearing in which it determined
that appellant had refused to subaiit to
such test, the Drivers License Division
(hereafter referred to as "the Division")
revoked appellant's driver's license for one
year, as required by U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-44.10(b). Appellant then filed a timely petition in the district count under the following provision of that statute:
Any person whose license has been revoked by the department under the provisions of this section shall have the right
to file a petition within thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the
district court in the county in which such
person shall reside. Such court is hereby
vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its
duty to set the matter for trial de novo
upon ten days' written notice to the department and thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case
and to determine whether the petitioner's
license is subject to revocation under the
provisions of this act.
At the hearing in the district court, the
judge, sitting pro tern, required appellant to
go forward with his evidence, ruling over
objection that appellant had the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that he had not refused a lawfully requested breathalyzer test. Appellant thereupon
called the arresting officer as a witness.
At the conclusion of a brief hearing, the
court found that appellant had not met his
burden by a preponderance of the evidence,

and ordered his driver's license revoked for
one year. For the reasons stated herein, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.*
Respondent, Director of the Division, argues that the appellant, as the plaintiff in
the district cofirt, had the burden of proof.
He relies on several decisions from the
highest courts of other states to the effect
that in a trial de novo review of an administrative revocation of a driver's license the
burden of going forward with evidence and
the burden of persuading by a preponderance of the evidence are on the licensee.
This was the holding in Buda v. Fulton, 261
Iowa 981, 157 N.W.2d 336 (1968), and Burbage v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 252
Or. 486, 450 P.2d 775 (1969), but there are
decisions to the contrary on this same point
in other states. Campbell v. Superior
Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971);
Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226, 182 S.E.2d
553, rehearing denied 279 N.C. 397, 183
S.E.2d Ml (1971); Chmelka v. Smith, 81
S.D. 40, 130 N.W.2d 423 (1964). No Utah
case has treated the meaning of "trial de
novo" under U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-44.10(b),
which has somewhat different language
than any of the statutes involved in the
cited cases.
[1] The words "de novo," meaning literally "anew, afresh, a second time," Black's
Law Dictionary 483 (4th ed. rev. 1968), have
at least two possible interpretations when
applied to judicial review of administrative
action: "(1) A complete retrial upon new
evidence; and (2) a trial upon the record
made before the lower tribunal." D. & R.
G. W. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
98 Utah 431, 436, 100 P.2d 552 (1940). In
that case, the Court said that the first
meaning was applicable to appeals from the
justice court, where the case was tried in
the district court "as if it originated there,"
and the second meaning was applicable to
the court's treatment of equity appeals,
where the parties were entitled to "a trial
de novg upon the record." Id.
The meaning of "trial de novo" in each
statute is obviously dictated by the wording
and context of the statute in which it appears and by the nature of the administra-

PLEDGER v. COX

Utah 417

Cite as, Utah, 626 ?J26 415

tive body, decision and procedure being reviewed. Thus, in D. & R. G. W. R. Co. v.
Public Service Commission, supra, the statute provided for review of a denial of a
contract motor carrier permit by an "action" for "plenary review" in the district
court, whose hearing should "proceed as a
trial de novo." Since "review" presupposed
the continued existence of the Commission
action, this Court held that the trial de novo
specified there was "a trial upon the record
made before the lower tribunal" without
the submission of new testimony. The purpose of the de novo requirement in that
statute was to signify that the scope of the
court's review of the record would include a
fresh consideration of questions of fact as
well as questions of law. 98 Utah at 438,
100 ?2d at 555.

Our conclusion is consistent with—if not
dictated by—this Court's decision in McAnerney v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 9
Utah 2d 191, 341 P.2d 212 (1959), which
involved the Division's suspension of a driver's license under U.C.A., 1953, 41-2-19 for
habitual negligent driving. The statute
that permitted the aggrieved party to petition for a court "hearing" in that case,
U.C.A., 1953, 41-2-20, is essentially identical to the statute in this case (41-6-44.10(b)) in its description of the nature of the
hearing and the court's determination, except that it makes no mention of a "trial de
novo." At the hearing in McAnerney, as in
this case, the district court put the burden
on the licensee, requiring him "to refute the
finding of the Department that the petitioner was a habitually negligent driver."
[2] In contrast, the district court which This Court reversed, holding that "it was
conducts the statutory "trial de novo" in the duty of the court to hear the case de
this case is specifically given the "duty . . . novo, and not merely as a review of the
to take testimony and examine into the action of the Department." 9 Utah 2d at
facts of the case and to determine whether 194, 341 P.2d at 214. Since that procedure
the petitioner's license is subject to revoca- was required in a statute which did not
tion under the provisions of this act." even mention "trial de novo," the McAnerU.C.A., 1953, 41-6~44.10(b). In context, ney case is an a fortiori authority for rethis is a clear legislative direction that in quiring the Division to bear the burden of
hearings under this statute the district proof and the burden of going forward in a
court should conduct what the D. & R. G. case where the statute explicitly directs a
W. case called "a complete retrial upon new "trial de novo."
evidence." This interpretation of trial de
novo affords a party who is about to suffer
[3] Even though the appellant in this
from administrative action a closer judicial case had the opportunity to present and did
scrutiny than a mere review of the record present his evidence in the district court (as
of agency action, and we think this prefera- respondent argues), when this was done unble in view of the seriousness of the admin- der a proceeding faulted by an erroneous
istrative action and the relative ease with ground rule about the sequence and burden
which the limited factual issue can be sub- of proof, as in the circumstances of this
jected to retrial in the district court.
case, we should not speculate about whether
the error was prejudical, but should reUpon such complete retrial, the Division
verse
and remand the case to the district
should obviously have the burden of proof
court
for
a new trial. So ordered.
and the burden of going forward with the
evidence. The petitioner must, of course,
MAUGHAN, C. J., and HALL, STEWset the review process in motion by an
appropriate and timely petition, and until ART and HOWE, JJ., concur.
and unless he has done so, the administrative action is valid and binding. But once
this is done, the district court has an entirely new proceeding, with the burdens allocated as if the Division were the moving
Party.

STATE v MILLIGAN

Utah
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Cite a* 727 ?2d 213 (Utah 1986)

N. George Daines, Logan, for defendants
and respondents.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff brought suit against defendants
to enforce the payment of monies owed
under a contract for the purchase of a
diamond. At the end of plaintiffs case in
chief, defendants brought a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties as to
the purchase price. The trial court granted
the motion by an unsigned minute entry
dated November 21, 1984, and plaintiff appeals from "the order entered in this action
on November 21, 1984." No order appears
in the record and apparently none was entered.
An appeal can be taken only from the
entry of a final judgment that concludes
the action. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.,
692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). An unsigned
minute entry does not constitute a final
judgment for purposes of appeal, and this
Court has no jurisdiction to consider the
merits of plaintiffs appeal. Utah R.Civ.P.
58A(b) and (c); Utah R.App.P. 3(a), 4(a);
South Salt Lake v. Burton, 718 P.2d 405
(1986); State Tax Commission v. Erekson,
714 P.2d 1151 (1986); Wisden v. City of
Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985); Wilson
v. Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiffs appeal is dismissed.
(O
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Howard Rodney MILLIGAN,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 860027.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 17, 1986.
Defendant was convicted after jury trial in the Third District Court, Salt Lake

County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., of driving
without a license and failing to appear, and
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court
held that: (1) statutes requiring person accused of violating traffic laws to appear in
court when he or she has promised to do so
and requiring that all drivers hold valid
license are valid exercise of state's police
power, and by failing to abide thereby,
defendant exposed himself to sanctions
specified in statutes, notwithstanding defendant's contention that he had constitutional right to locomotion and that, so long
as he operated vehicle in reasonable manner, he was not subject to state's regulation of its highways; (2) officer was authorized to issue defendant citation for driving
without license; and (3) sentences were not
excessive or unreasonable.
Affirmed.
Stewart, Associate C.J., concurred in
result.

1. Courts <s=248
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
cases commencing in justice court where
issues raised involve constitutional issue.
2. Automobiles ®=34
Statute requiring person accused of violating traffic lawrs to appear in court when
he or she has promised to do so and requiring that all drivers hold valid license are
valid exercise of state's police power, and
by failing to abide thereby, defendant exposed himself to sanctions specified in statute, notwithstanding defendant's contention that he had constitutional right to locomotion and that, so long as he operated
vehicle in reasonable manner, he was not
subject to state's regulation of its highways. U.C.A.1953, 41-2-2, 41-6-168.
3. Automobiles <£=>355(2)
Defendant's statement to police officer
at scene of accident that defendant was
driver of van was sufficient to support
operating automobile without license con-
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viction, even though officer did not actual!)
see defendant operating van.
4, Criminal Law c»5o3
Number of witnesses is not critical, so
long as evidence presented is sufficient to
support factual findings of jurv.
"i. \utomobiles c=319
Police officer for technical college in
Salt Lake County had authority to issue
defendant citation for driving without license. U.C.A 1953, 77™K%>>U).
f> Vutomobiles c=»359
Sentence of 15 days in jail, $150 fine,
and $6 postassessment fees on driver's license violation and sentence of five days m
jail, $50 fine, and $4 postassessment fee on
failing to appear conviction, with both jail
terms suspended on payment of fines, were
not unreasonable, despite defendant's contention he was fined excessive amount because of his request for jury trial; sentences imposed by district court were precisely same as those imposed by justice
court m nonjury trial
7. Criminal Law 012U.8U)
Sentences of 15 days in jail, $150 fine,
and $6 postassessment fee, and five days in
jail, $50 fine, and $4 postassessment fee on
driver's license violation and failure to appear convictions were not cruel and unusual on ground fines were higher than
guidelines set for bail, where sentences
were within statutory allowances.
Andrew A. \ aldez, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M
Hale, Earl F, Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gens ,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
PER CURIAM.
This is a pro se appeal of district court
convictions of driving without a license
<l\C A.. 1953, § 41-2-2) and of failing to
appear in court (U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-168).
1. The officer later discovered that defendant
had a license at one time but allowed it tn

Defendant was tried in absentia in a
bench trial in justice court and found guilty
as charged. He thereafter sought and was
accorded a trial de novo in district court.
The case was tried to a jury, and guilty
verdicts were returned on both counts of
the information.
The only witness called to testify at trial
was Glasper Bowman, who testified that he
is a police officer for Utah Technical College in Salt Lake County. On January 8,
1985, Officer Bowman was dispatched to
the scene of a traffic accident at 4500
South and 1700 West. The accident was
apparently caused by a small car which, as
the result of icy road conditions, slid into
defendant's van. The car was making a
right turn, and the van was stopped at a
traffic light When Officer Bowman arrived at the scene, he was directed to the
two drivers of the vehicles, both of whom
were standing outside. The officer asked
the drivers for their driver's licenses and
vehicle registrations. Defendant produced
his vehicle registration, but stated he did
not have a driver's license. Officer Bowman called in a license check and was told
there was not one on file.1 The officer
issued defendant a citation for driving
without a license. Defendant thereafter
failed to appear in court as he had promised when he signed the traffic citation.
He was tried and convicted in justice court
and later, m <i trial de novo in district
court.
HI In his brief on appeal, defendant
states that he "relies strictly on Constitutional and Scriptural law " His points on
appeal include (1) right to locomotion; (2)
insufficiency of witnesses; (3) lack of authority in the arresting officer; and (4)
excessive fines. The State suggests that
we summarily affirm in view of defendant's failure to cite to the record and to
support his arguments by legal analysis
and authority. See State v. Sutton, 707
P2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985V fan appellant's
failure to cite to the record i.-> grounds for
expire.
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c the trial court); State v. Ami•'.* P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (we
^ to rule on an argument not supauthorities). However, since de;
.s here pro se and because the
appeal meets our threshold for review7,2 we
"*ri^fly address the issues raised.

to support the factual findings of the jury.
As abstracted above. Bowman's testimony
is sufficient to support th*- \*-rdict in T;U*
instant case.

2. We have jurisdiction over cases commencing
in ji istice court where the issues raised involve a
constitutional issue. State v Hamilton, 710
P.2d 174 (Utah 1985),

3.

""'

[5] Defendant argues that Officer Bowman niid not have the authority to arrest
him because he was a category II officer at
\mt contends that he has a
the time of the arrest. In January 1985,
• ight of locomotion and that,
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-l-3(5)(b)(i) provided as
so long as htj operates his vehicle in a
follows:
reasonable manner, he is not subject to the
Category II peace officers shall have
state's regulation of its highways. We
total
peace officer authority wrhen on
have clearly held that "conditions for operduty and when acting in relation to the
ation of motor vehicles on public roads is a
responsibilities of the peace officer's
proper subject for state regulation artd conagency;
provided, however, category II
trol" State v. Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579,
peace
officers
shall have the powers of a
580 (Utah 1985}. U.C.A., 1953, § 41-2-2
category
I
peace
officer over felonies or
requires that ail drivers in Utah hold a
misdemeanors
committed
within their
valid license. Likewise, U.C.A., 1953,
presence.
§ 41-6-168 requires that a person accused
of violating the traffic laws must appear in Based on the foregoing statute and under
court when he or she has promised to do the evidence adduced, it would appear that
so. The statutes are a valid exercise of the a category II peace officer would have had
state's police power and, by failing to abide the authority to cite defendant for driving
thereby, defendant has exposed himself to without a license. How-ever, the evidence
at trial established that Bowman was a
the sanctions specified.
category
I peace officer.3 U.C.A., 1953,
[3,4] Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury § 77-l-3(5)(a) specifically provided that
verdict since Officer Bowman did not actu- any police officer employed by any public
ally see defendant operating his van. We college is a category I peace officer. On
have held that a peace officer need not see the facts of this case, it is clear that Bowthe person driving, as long as he has rea- man was authorized to issue defendant a
sonable grounds to believe that the person citation for driving without a license.
was in actual physical control of the motor
[6,7] In his final argument, defendant
vehicle. Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle challenges the reasonableness of his senDivision, 595 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1979). tence. On the driver's license violation,
In the instant case, defendant actually stat- defendant was sentenced to 15 days in jail,
ed to the officer at the scene (Bowman) $150 fine, and $6 post-assessment fee. For
that he was the driver of the van. The failing to appear, he was sentenced to 5
officer therefore had reasonable grounds days in jail, $50 fine, and $4 post-assessto believe that defendant was operating a ment fee. Both jail terms were to be susvehicle. Defendant also suggests that the pended on payment of the fines. Defendevidence is insufficient since Bowrman was ant contends that he was fined an excessive
the only witness to testify against him. amount because of his request for a jury.
The number of witnesses is not critical, so This claim is not supported by the record.
long as the evidence presented is sufficient The sentences imposed by the district court
When asked at trial what category of police
officer he was, Bowman responded that he is "a
Certified Academy One police officer." He also
stated that he was operating in that capacity on
January 8, 1985.
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were precisely the same as those imposed
by the justice court in a nonjury trial. Defendant also contends that the sentences
constitute cruel and unusual punishment
since the fines are higher than the guidelines set for bail. This argument is specious. Since the sentences are within the
statutory allowances, and because the statutory5 sanctions are rational, defendant has
not been subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment.
Affirmed.

2 in iry S=>33(1.1) •
Sixth Amendment ensures only that a
particular segment of the .community will
not be systematically excluded from the
jury venire; juries actually chosen need not
mirror the community or reflect various
distinctive groups in the population, U.S.
C A Const. A mend. 6.
3. Jury ^33(1.3)
Failure of jury to include some members of black race did not violate constitutional rights of black defendant, where
there was no evidence of systematic exclusion of jurors based upon racial considerations. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
Thomas J. McCormick, o
'.•'>>• ''^,
for defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson. Atty. Gen., Earl F.
Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and respondent.

The ST ATE of Utah, Plaintiff •
and Respondent,
\,
Sandra Kay BANKHEAD, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 860012
Supreme Court of Utah,
Oct. 20, 1986.
Defendant was convicted before the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Leonard R. Russon, J., of fraudulent use of
a credit card, and she appealed. The Supreme Court held that failure of jury to
: K
— *de some members of black race did not
. .*e constitutional rights of black ciefi -i-i.int. where there was no evidence of
-\ -•« matic exclusion of jurors based upon
r.r i.ii considerations.
Affirmed.
.ry O U 2
Defendant's motion to u
el was not made until after

'*v nanHM HMCH-MT

PER CURIAM:
" '
Defendant appeals her conviction under
'.C.A , 1953, § 76-6-506.1 for fraudulent
use of a credit card.
Testimony at trial established that on
August 30, 1985, defendant made several
purchases of wearing apparel at various
stores in downtown Salt Lake City. To pay
for the merchandise, she used a credit card
belonging to Louie Sims and signed "Rita
Sims" on the charge forms. When an employee at one of the stores became suspicious, the ^police wTere called. Defendant
told the investigating officer that her name
was Rita Sims and that the' credit card
belonged to her husband. The officer
thereupon called Louie Sims, who stated
that his wife's name was not Rita and that
he had not authorized anyone to use his
credit card. Defendant wras thereupon arrested.
Mr. Sims owns an auto repair shop in
Salt Lake City. He has been married to
Thelma Sims for nineteen years, during
which time he has periodically dated other
w< >m*in.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
William Clifford HARTLEY and Jay Charles
Wade,
Defendants and Appellant.
No. 880375-CA
FILED: December 20, 1989 .
Seventh District, San Juan County
Honorable Boyd Bunnell
ATTORNEYS:
Lyle R. Anderson, Monticello, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Barbara Bearnson, Salt
Lake City, for Respondent
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant William Charles Bartley appeals
from his conviction of theft, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§766-404,-412(b)(i) (1#78). We affirm.
FACTS
The southeastern portion of San Juan
County is a sparsely-populated area consisting largely of farms, ranches, and oil and gas
wells. The county sheriffs office had received
reports for several months in late 1986 that
"drip gas" thefts were occurring in the area.
Drip gas, also known as "gas condensate/ is a
liquid byproduct condensed from gas and
stored at the wellhead for eventual sale to
pipeline companies. Unrefined drip gas is clear
in color and rank in odor, and may be used as
a fuel or cleaning solvent.
On December 26, 1986, at 11:06 p.m., a
report was made to the sheriffs office that
there were three pickup trucks with trailers
and portable liquid storage tanks traveling into
Patterson Canyon, an area of producing oil
wells. Sheriff S. Rigby Wright and Deputy
Sheriff Jack Kirby proceeded to the area to
investigate. At the entrance to Patterson
Canyon, they met with two oilfield workers
who provided a description of the three vehicles. The two officers then drove into the
canyon to a point at which they could-see a
couple of miles down the road. At approximately 12^30 a.m., they parkedJn th* miHHl*
of the gravel roadway and_wai£ed^> Fifteen or
twenty minutes later, the officers observed
three sets of headlights approaching. The
sheriff instructed Kirby to use his vehicle's red
MCE REPORTS
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stoplight to stop the approaching vehicles was aware of legitimate drip gas transfers in
when they were near enough, and then the the area, knew of none that would have occurred the night in question, and, in any event,
sheriff walked up the road to wait for them.
• The first vehicle stopped was a pickup truck stated that no one could have lawfully drained
with a liquid storage tank on its bed and three the tank without his approval. He further
tanks on a trailer. The sheriff testified that the stated that the smell of drip gas from the
vehicles were "lugged down" and moving Wintershall site was unique, and matched the
slowly as if heavily laden. He also said that he odor of gas in the tanks confiscated from
smelled the rank odor of drip gas. The driver, defendants.
later identified as co-defendant Jay Charles
A state criminologist testified that samples
Wade, got out and was told to secure his of drip gas residue taken from the Wintershall
vehicle and walk up to the police car. A few tank and samples taken from residues on
moments later, a second pickup truck drove defendant's clothing were chemically evaluup and stopped. It was pulling a large tank ated and were found to be comparable. Tire
and trailer unit. The driver, later identified as marks and footprints at the scene of the theft
the defendant, got out, tucked something into were also found to be consistent with defenthe front of his pants, and began walking dants' vehicles and footwear.
toward the police car. The sheriff, shotgun in
Defendants refuted the State's evidence by
hand, came up behind defendant and told him claiming that the impounded gas had been
to keep his hands in view. Both men were legally obtained elsewhere. Wade's uncle tesfrisked, handcuffed, and placed in the police tified that he had traded defendant the fuel
car. A .38 caliber revolver was found in the for a truckload of wood. Although defendant
waistband of defendant's pants during the did not testify, Wade told the jury that defefrisk.
ndant had picked up the fuel and had asked
The sheriff soon realized that the third him to help move it. Wade testified that they
vehicle had turned and fled. The officers, with were in the process of transporting it when
the two suspects in tow, unsuccessfully sear- they were stopped by the sheriff.
ched for the third vehicle for almost an hour.
The jury subsequently convicted both defeEventually, the officers met again with the two ndants of theft of drip gas valued at more
oilfield workers, who led them to a nearby than $250 and less than $1,000.
drip gas collection site. There were various
THE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
signs that a drip gas storage tank owned by
Defendant first asserts that the "roadblock"
Wintershall Oil & Gas had been drained. The
which
led to the
ground was wet with water and paraffin, two
seizure of evidence and his subsequent arrest
substances that must frequently be drained off
stored drip gas. The site was also crisscrossed was not of the variety approved in dicta in
with fresh tire marks and footprints and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), nor
smelled strongly of drip gas. On the storage for a demonstrable emergency, and was, thetank itself, the officers found an unauthorized refore, illegal.
Defendant mischaracterizes the stop of his
seal on one of the two discharge valves. A
similar seal was later found in defendant's vehicle. The record plainly indicates that this
was not a^ random stop or checkpoint designed
truck.
The officers then returned to the scene of to screen vehicles for unsuspected illegal actithe arrests and impounded the two trucks and vity such as violations of safety, licensing,
trailers. The sheriff opened the valve on one immigration, or wildlife conservation laws.
tank and a liquid squirted out similar in app- Nor was it designed to capture escaped prisoearance and smell to drip gas. The two susp- ners or felons fleeing from the police. Rather,
ects were transported to jail and their shoes it was designed to effectuate an investigative
and outer clothing, which gave off an odor of stop 1of three suspicious vehicles in an isolated
drip gas, were impounded as evidence. The area. When making such a stop, "officers
vehicles and trailers were stored in an may take such steps as are 'reasonably neceimpound yard. Later that morning, the sheriff ssary to protect their personal safety and to
plumbed the confiscated tanks and determined maintain the status quo' so that the limited
that two of the five tanks were full of drip purposes of the stop may be achieved." United
gas, one was almost full, and two were empty. States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 636-37 (8th
A jury trial was conducted on April 12 and Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Hensley,
13, 1988. A witness for the State testified that 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985)), cert, denied, 474
he saw three pickup trucks with trailers and U.S. 837 (1985).
We find no particular significance in the
tanks driving toward the oil field at about
fact
that this stop was accomplished by means
10:30 p.m. on the night of the theft. When the
vehicles passed him, he heard the tanks rattle of a "roadblock" rather than by some other
as if they were empty, and could smell no method. The blockade of a suspect vehicle
odor. The contractor who maintained the "generally will be reasonable ... because of the
Wintershall site placed the value of the stolen chance that the suspect may flee upon the
drip gas at $929.50. He also testified that he approach of police with resulting danger to the
UTAH ADVANCE
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public as well as to the officers involved." view exception, we have already established
Jones, 759 F.2d at 638. In this case, there J that the initial stop of defendant's vehicle was
existed the potential of at least several susp- valid, thus making the sheriffs presence
ects, limited numbers of present and available lawful. There is also testimony that the odor
law enforcement personnel, and a significant of drip gas was apparent to the officers, thus
risk (later realized) that the suspects were establishing that the drip gas evidence could be
armed. We find nothing unreasonable in the plainly smelled. We need.only to determine
sheriffs selection of the ^o^idblock" as a whether that odor was clearly incriminating.
means of minimizing the risk of flight or res- "Clearly incriminating" is a term which has
istance by the suspects.
been defined as "probable cause to associate
The more important question in this case the property with criminal activity." Holmes,
remains whether the stop of defendant's 774 P.2d at 510 (quoting State v. Kelly, 718
vehicle was legally justified. The jtoppiag of P.2d 385, 390 (Utah 1986)).
an automobile and the detention of its occuDefendant argues that because the sheriff
pants constitutes a "seizure" within the had no actual knowledge that a theft of drip
meaning of the fourth amendment, State v. gas had occurred at the time defendant was
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. stopped, "probable cause" for the seizure of
1988), and must therefore be supported by at the evidence or for his arrest cannot be estaleast a reasonable and articulable suspicion, blished. However, officers cannot be expected
based on objective facts, that the occupants to begin their investigations only after the
are involved in criminal activity. State v. confirmation of a theft, and frequently
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per develop probable cause prior to such reports.
curiam); Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1982); See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 296 F.2d
see also State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d 2, 3 427 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (discovery of fur piece
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (those facts may include with price tag attached led to arrest for receipt
rational inferences).
of stolen property); People v. Carnes, 173 Cal.
Based on the objective facts as articulated App. 2d 559, 343 P.2d 626 (1959) (tools and
by the trial court, we have no doubt that this radio led to arrest for laboratory burglary);
threshold was passed. The sheriff had knowl- State v. Temple, 1 Or. App. 91, 488 P.2d 1380
edge of recent thefts of drip gas in the area (1971) (copper wire in truck led to arrest for
and a report that three pickup trucks with theft), cert, denied, 406 U.S 973 (1972); State
empty storage tanks were seen driving into the v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982) (CB
desolate area in the dead of night. He was also radio on backseat led to arrest for vehicle
aware that the legitimate transfer of drip gas burglary); State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103
was usually accomplished by commercial (Utah 1980) (tools and coins led to arrest for
tanker trucks and semitrailers during daylight burglary of laundromat); State v. Harris, 78
hours. The sheriffs information was then Wash. 2d 558, 477 P.2d 923 (1970) (en banc)
corroborated by the appearance of three (sledgehammer and firearm led to arrest for
pickup trucks with tanks and trailers, two of burglary of restaurant); State v. Brooks, 57
which, prior to being stopped, appeared to be Wash. 2d 422, 357 P.2d 735 (1960)
heavily laden. We thus conclude that the (unhemmed pants with attached sales tags led
initial stop was valid under the reasonable to arrest for larceny).
suspicion standard.
In establishing probable cause, as the term
suggests, we deal not in certainties, but in
PROBABLE CAUSE
"probabilities." See Brinegar v. United States,
We now turn to the seizure of the tanks 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). The quantum of
containing drip gas and the arrest of defen- evidence needed for probable cause is signifidant resulting from that seizure. A search and cantly less than that needed to prove guilt. Stare
seizure conducted without a warrant is unre- v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Utah Ct.
ajonablejjfiiLse unless it falls within a recog- App. 1988). Whether probable cause exists
nized exception to the warrant requirement of "depends upon an examination of all the infthe fourth amendment. State v. Holmes, 774 ormation available to the searching officer in
P.2d 506, 510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Objects light of the circumstances as they existed at
in "plain view" constitute one such exception, the time the search was made." State v.
and may be seized without a warrant if the Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). The
police officer is lawfully present and the evi- officer is also "entitled to assess the facts in
dence is clearly incriminating. Id. This excep- light of [his or her] experience." Holmes, 114
tion encompasses evidence within "plain P.2d at 509 (quoting United States v. Bngnonismell," see 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975)).
§2.2(a) (2d ed. 1987), there being no reasoThe facts known to the sheriff at the time
nable expectation of privacy from the
"inquisitive nostrils" of lawfully present offi- included: recent thefts of drip gas in the area;
cers. United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397, the late hour; the infrequently traveled roads;
the report of potential theft activity by those
398 (9th Cir. 1974).
with knowledge of legal gas transfers; the
In reviewing the requirements of the plain presence of trucks with empty tanks headed
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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into the area; the transportation of drip gas by demand an absolutely certain judgment before
atypical means; the lack of a retail market for he may act." State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d
the sale of drip gas; and most significantly, 129, 132, 499 P.2d 276, 278 (1972) (clear error
the distinctive, if not unique, odor of drip gas- standard of review).
We conclude that the trial court committed
-an odor the sheriff testified he recognized
no clear error either in its denial of defenfrom previous investigative work.
Absent clear error, we will not disturb a dant's motion to suppress or in its finding of
trial court's factual assessment underlying a probable cause for arrest.
decision to deny a motion to suppress evidADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
ence. State v. Droneburg, 120 Utah Adv. Rep.
Over defendant's objection, the court
27, 28 (Ct. App. 1989). "Clear error is indicated when the trial court's factual assessment I admitted testimony that defendant was carris against the clear weight of the evidence or it I ying a .38 caliber revolver when he was arreinduces a firm conviction that a mistake has sted. Similarly, the court permitted the jury to
been committed." Id. No clear error is indic- hear testimony that two days after defendant's
ated here. The officers had reasonable suspi- arrest, the lock and chain on the gate to the
cion to stop defendant's vehicle. Once they sheriff's impound lot had been cut off, and
recognized the distinctive odor of drip gas, the pickup trucks and trailers seized as evidthat suspicion ripened into probable cause to ence were gone. Defendant now argues that
associate that odor with criminal activity. The the admission of such evidence was erroneous
requirements of the plain view exception were because it was irrelevant and prejudicial.
The State argues that the admission of the
satisfied, and the evidence could properly be
firearm evidence was not erroneous on the
seized without a warrant.
We also conclude that defendant's arrest basis that it was "relevant to explain the circumstances of defendant's crime and arrest."
was proper:
The State does not fully explain this stateAn officer may arrest an individual
ment, but we note that the admission of eviwithout a warrant either when he
dence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" may
has reasonable cause to believe a
be relevant to show "motive, opportunity,
felony has been committed and that
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
the person arrested committed it or
or absence of mistake or accident." See Utah
when the officer has reasonable
R. Evid. 404(b). The record is unclear why the
cause to believe the person has
trial court admitted this evidence, but the fact
committed a public offense and
that defendant secreted this firearm on his
there is a reasonable basis for beliperson immediately prior to his arrest seems
eving the person will destroy or
relevant to show intent, preparation, plan, or
conceal evidence of the commission
knowledge.
of the offense.
The State further defends the admission of
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah testimony regarding the removal of the imp1986); see also Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 ounded trucks and trailers as relevant to
(Supp. 1989). "Reasonable cause" is determ- explain the absence of physical evidence at
ined objectively, i.e., "whether from the facts I trial. We agree. The trial judge stated:
known to the officer, and the inferences which
So, I don't think you can have it
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable
both ways ... that you can argue
and prudent person in his position would be
lack of evidence to convict, and
justified in believing that the suspect had
then at the same time restrict the
committed the offense." State v. Cole, 61A
State from explaining why some of
P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v.
the evidence is not here for the
Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259
jury's observation .... I'm sure
(1972)); see also Banks, 720 P.2d at 1383.
we're going to be getting into
The officers in this case detected the distivalues and quantities of the material
nctive odor of drip gas after stopping defenthat was there, which will have to
dant's vehicle. It is well-established that
be given probably by estimate
probable cause for arrest may arise from an
rather than actual measurement.
officer's sense of smell. See, e.g., Johnson v.
And I think the jury is entitled to
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (opium);
know why those things are being
State v. Valenzuela, 121 Ariz. 274, 589 P.2d
used.
1306, 1307 (1979) (en banc) (marijuana).
Although all relevant evidence is admissible,
Under the circumstances, reasonable and
see
Utah R. Evid. 402, such evidence may be
prudent persons could believe that the drip gas
had been stolen. As stated previously, the fact excluded "if its probative value is substantially
that the officers had no specific knowledge outweighed by the danger of unfair prejuthat the drip gas was indeed stolen is not cri- dice." Utah R. Evid. 403. The question of
tical since "a police officer is not required to whether the probative value of the evidence is
meet any such standard of perfection as to substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudUTAH
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State v. Hartley
124 Utah Adv. Rep. 40

icial effect is "generally entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial judge and will not be
upset on appeal absent manifest error." Stare
in re R.D.S., 777 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (quoting State v. Maurcr, 770 P.2d
981,983 (Utah 1989)).
We see no manifest error. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it "'appeals to the jury's
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish,' or otherwise
'may cause a jury to base its decision on
something other than the established propositions in the case.'" Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984
(quoting Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 97273 (3d Cir. 1980)). The balancing test of rule
403 thus excludes "matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels
for the sake of its prejudicial effect." /d.
(quoting United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d
700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 862
(1979)). In agreement with the trial court's
rulings, we conclude that the probative value
of the challenged testimony exceeded its prejudicial effect.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
We last address an issue first raised not by
defendant, but by the State, in adherence to
its duty to promote justice. See State v.
Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980). During
the course of trial, co-defendant Wade was
cross-examined by the prosecutor about his
post-arrest silence in explaining his possession of drip gas. An objection was timely
made by Wade's counsel, but overruled by the
court. The State concedes that the failure by
the court to sustain the objection may have
impliedly violated this defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination.2 See
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,619 (1976); Griffin
v. California,
380 U . S . 6 0 9 , 613
(1965), reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965); State
v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah
1987); Stare v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1205
(Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 739 P.2d
628 (1987). The State further suggests,
however, that the error, if any, was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tillman, 750
P.2d. at 555 ("[A]n otherwise valid conviction
should not be set aside if the reviewing court
may confidently say, on the whole record, that
the constitutional enor was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.") (quoting Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
Direct reference by a prosecutor to
a defendant's decision not to testify
is always a violation of the defendant's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. Indirect
references to a defendant's failure
to testify are constitutionally impermissible if the comments were
manifestly intended to be or were of
such a character that the jury would
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naturally and necessarily construe
them to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify.
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 554 (footnote omitted).
In Tillman, there was overwhelming evidence of Tillman's guilt, the remarks of the
prosecutor were isolated, and the jury was
instructed not to draw any adverse presumption from Tillman's failure to testify. Id. at
555. Similarly, the circumstantial evidence of
defendant's guilt in the instant case was overwhelming, the offensive cross-examination
was isolated rather than pervasive, and the
judge gave the jury the following curative
instruction:
You are instructed that the Defendant Bartley in this case has not
taken the witness stand in his own
behalf, and that this is his legal and
constitutional right and is not any
evidence of his guilt, directly or
indirectly, and you are instructed
that you are not to consider his
failure to testify in this case for any
purpose, and [neither] should you
allude to such failure in your deliberations or consider it for any
purpose whatsoever.
In view of these factors, we hold that any
error in defendant's case resulting from the
cross-examination of co-defendant Wade
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant's conviction is affirmed.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. This conclusion is supported by the fact that a
roadblock for any other purpose would have been
senseless in view of the sheriffs testimony that only
one unrelated vehicle was observed in the area
during the 4-5 hour period following defendant's
arrest.
2. Defendant also claims ineffective assistance of
counsel based on his counsel's initial failure to
object to the testimony, and the failure to include
that issue in his opening appellate brief. Utah has
adopted a two-part test for the review of such
claims: A defendant must show that his or her
counsel performed deficiently such lhat the performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and that the performance was prejudicial, such that absent the error, a
different outcome was reasonably likely. State v.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893-94 & n.30 (Utah 1989); see
also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). The initial failure to object to the testimony may well have constituted deficient pe^ormance. See Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205. However, the
cross-examination was objected to during trial, and
the issue was raised for appellate review, albeit by
the State. We therefore cannot conclude that
counsel's deficient performance induced a different
result. Defendant has not otherwise demonstrated
deficient performance in his counsel's representa-
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230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
RE:

State v. Novosel, Case No. 890143-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, the State now provides the following supplemental
authority to support its position regarding the constitutionality
of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(13)(a).
At the time of oral argument in this matter, the State
cited this Court's decision of City of Monticello v. Christensen,
769 P.2d 853 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A writ of certiorari had been
granted by the Utah Supreme Court on that decision; on March 2,
1990, the Supreme Court handed down its decision affirming this
Court's position in that case. A copy of that decision is
attached to this letter.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,

l
CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CB:bks
cc: Mitchel Zager, Attorney for Appellant
Sherry Ragan, Deputy Utah County Attorney

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00
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v.

Lee Christensen,
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Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Seventh Circuit, San Juan County
The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday
Attorneys:

Lyle Anderson, Monticello, for plaintiff
Lee Christensen, Evanston, Wyoming, pro se
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant Lee Christensen, convicted in circuit
court of operating a motor vehicle in Utah while his privilege to drive was suspended, claims error in the dismissal of
his appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. He argues, inter
alia, that the court violated his constitutional right to an
appeal, as guaranteed by article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, when it dismissed his appeal and that even if
the court did not violate his constitutional rights, it
nonetheless erred in dismissing his appeal because he
properly preserved a constitutional issue, as required by
section 77-35-26(13)(a) of the Code. We affirm.
Christensen, a Wyoming resident and a holder of a
Wyoming driver's license, was involved in an automobile
accident while driving in Utah in October of 1986. In
February of 1987, the state of Utah suspended for one year
Christensen's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah.
Sfifi Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19 (1981) (amended 1987, 1988, &
1989; now codified at § 41-2-128 (Supp. 1989)). The state
took this action because Christensen failed to provide
security for the damages he caused in the 1986 accident.
In September of 1987, Christensen was stopped by the
police while driving within the city limits of Monticello,
Utah. He was arrested and charged with two violations:
(i) driving during suspension, and (ii) driving without
insurance. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-28 (1981) (amended

1987 & 1989; now codified at § 41-2-136 (Supp. 1989));*
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 (Supp. 1986) (amended 1987).
Christensen posted bond, and the matter was scheduled for a
hearing before a justice of the peace, pursuant to section
78-5-4 of the Code. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-4 (1987)
(repealed 1989; now codified at § 78-5-114 (Supp. 1989)).2
In January of 1988, Christensen appeared before a
justice of the peace and unsuccessfully argued that the
1. At the time Christensen was arrested, Monticello had
adopted by ordinance the Utah traffic laws in effect in 1985.
Therefore, Christensen was actually charged with violating two
Monticello ordinances. However, since the ordinances are
identical to certain sections of the Utah Code, this opinion
will refer to those sections. Section 41-2-28 provides:
Any person whose operator's or
chauffer's license has been suspended or
revoked, as provided in this act, and who
shall drive any motor vehicle upon the
highways of this state while such license
is suspended or revoked, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
shall be punished as provided in section
41-2-30.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-28 (1981) (amended 1987 & 1989; now
codified at § 41-2-136 (Supp. 1989)). Section 41-2-l(o)
defines "license" to be "the privilege to operate a motor
vehicle over the highways of this state." Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-2-1 (1981) (amended 1987 & 1989; now codified at
§ 41-2-102(12) (Supp. 1989)). Section 41-2-l(p) defines
"license certificate" as "the evidence of the privilege to
operate a motor vehicle over the highways of this state."
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-l(p) (1981) (amended 1987 & 1989; now
codified at § 41-2-102(13) (Supp. 1989)).
2. Section 78-5-4 provides:
Justices' courts have concurrent
jurisdiction of the following public
offenses committed within the respective
counties in which such courts are
established:
(1) all class B and class C
misdemeanors punishable by a fine no
greater than the maximum fine for a class
B or C misdemeanor under 76-3-301, or by
imprisonment in the county jail or
municipal prison not exceeding six months,
or by both the fine and imprisonment; and
(2) all infractions and the
punishments prescribed for them.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-4 (1987) (repealed 1989; now codified
at § 78-5-114 (Supp. 1989)).
No. 890163
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••driving under suspension* charge against him should be
dismissed. He was convicted of that charge, sentenced to
thirty days in the county jail, and required to pay a $200
fine- The sentence was stayed, and Christensen appealed to
the circuit court under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.
That rule provides in part:
(13) An appeal may be taken to the
circuit court from a judgment rendered in
the justice court in accordance with the
provision of this rule, except:
(a) the case shall be tried anew in
the circuit court and the decision of the
circuit court is final except where the
validity or constitutionality of a statute
or ordinance is raised in the justice
court.
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(13)(a) (1987) (amended 1989; codified at
§ 77-35-26(13)(a) (Supp. 1989) (code provision, but not
rule, repealed effective July 1, 1990)).3 A trial de novo
was held in the circuit court in March of 1988. Christensen
was again convicted of driving under suspension and again
fined $200 and sentenced to thirty days in jail.
Christensen next appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals, which dismissed the appeal, reasoning that under
rule 26(13)(a), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter
because -the validity or constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance [had not been] raised in the justice court.* Utah
R. Crim. P. 26(13)(a); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769
P.2d 853, 854 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The court of appeals
reached this conclusion after reviewing the documentary
records from the justice court and from the circuit court.
Neither of these evidenced a raising of a challenge to a
statute's validity or constitutionality, although the court
of appeals acknowledged that it could not determine with
certainty what had occurred in these two courts because no
transcript is kept in a justice court and Christensen had not
provided a tape or transcript of the circuit court hearing
although one was kept. 769 P.2d at 855.
3. Section 78-5-14 of the Code also authorizes persons to
appeal justice court decisions to a circuit court. That
section provides:
Any person dissatisfied with a
judgment rendered in a justices' [sic]
court, whether the same was rendered on
default or after trial, is entitled to a
trial de novo in the circuit court of the
county as provided by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-14 (1987) (repealed 1989; now codified
at § 78-5-120 (Supp. 1989)).

Following the court of appeals' denial of his
petition for a rehearing, Christensen sought certiorari from
this Court. We granted the writ in order to consider the
question of whether the appeal procedure prescribed in
rule 26(13)(a) comports with the appeal guarantee of
article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
Article I, section 12 provides in part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in
his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases.
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (emphasis added).
Christensen claims that his right -to an appeal"
was violated when the court of appeals refused to give his
appeal the plenary consideration usually afforded any other
appeal from the circuit or district court. Specifically,
he argues that the guarantee of "an appeal" in article I,
section 12 connotes an on-the-record review of the trial
court's action, something that by definition cannot be
provided via a trial de novo in the circuit court. Therefore, the only vehicle for vindication of his rights to an
appeal is full review of the circuit court action by the
court of appeals, and the limitation on the scope of the
court of appeals' review imposed by rule 26(13)(a) is
unconstitutional.
In considering Christensen's claim that
rule 26(13)(a) is unconstitutional, we follow the settled
rule that "legislative enactments are endowed with a strong
presumption of validity and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no reasonable basis upon which they
can be construed as conforming to constitutional requirements." In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct., 754
P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988); see aXSP Blue Cross & Blue Shield
v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989); City of West Jordan
v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah
1988). And we accord a lower court's statement of the law,
statutory interpretation, or legal conclusion no particular
deference, but review it for correctness. See, e.g., State
v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 127 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Feb. 8, 1990);
No. 890163
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State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989); Utah
State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light
£Q^, 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989).
Article I, section 12 provides, "In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to
appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
Rule 26(13)(a) labels an "appeal" a trial de novo in the
circuit court, with only limited review of that decision
by the court of appeals. The determination of whether
rule 26(13)(a) is constitutional depends on what is meant
by the word "appeal" in article I, section 12. We conclude
that in Utah, at least, it is settled that the right to an
"appeal" from a court not of record is satisfied by provision for a trial de novo in a court of record. The reasons
for this conclusion are largely historical.
The guarantee in article I, section 12 providing
a right of appeal has been in the constitution since
statehood. From 1896 until 1984, it coexisted with a
version of article VIII, section 9 of the Utah Constitution
which provided in part:
Appeals shall also lie from the final
judgment of justices of the peace in civil
and criminal cases to District Courts on
both questions of law and fact, with such
limitations and restrictions as shall be
provided by law; and the decision of the

Pistrict Courts on such appeals shall be
final, except in cases involving the
validity or constitutionality of a statute.
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 9 (repealed 1984) (emphasis
added). The right of appeal from a justice of the peace to
the district court referred to in article VIII, section 1 was
a trial de novo because justice courts have never been courts
of record.
Statutes with language substantially similar to
article VIII, section 9 have existed since statehood. For
example, chapter 109, section 18 of the 1901 Laws of Utah
provided in part:
From all final judgments of a city
court . . . an appeal may be taken by
either party in a civil case, or by the
defendant in a criminal case, to the
district court of the county in the manner
and with like effect as is now, or may be
provided by law for appeals from justices'
courts in similar cases, and from all
final judgments in the district courts

rendered upon such appeals, an appeal may
be taken to the supreme court in like
manner as if said actions were originally
commenced in the district court . . . and

provided further* that in all cases
involving the validity or constitutionality
of the statute, there shall be a right of

appeal to the supreme court*
1901 Utah Laws ch. 109, § 18 (emphasis added),4
In decisions from statehood until 1983, this Court
repeatedly held that a person dissatisfied with a justice
court decision could appeal that decision to a district
court and that the district court decision was final unless
the validity or constitutionality of a statute was at issue,
not on appeal, but in the lower court. See, e.g., State v.
Van Gervan, 657 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1983); State v. Munoer, 642
P.2d 721 (Utah 1982); Vernal Citv v. Critton. 565 P.2d 408
(Utah 1977); State v. Lyte. 75 Utah 283, 284 P. 1006 (1930);
Eureka City v. Wilson. 15 Utah 53, 48 P. 41 (1897), aff'd,
173 U.S. 32 (1899); see alSO State v. Tavlor. 664 P.2d 439
(Utah 1983). In State y. Lyte, 75 Utah at 287, 284 P.2d at
1007, this Court explicitly rejected a challenge based on
article I, section 12 to a statute worded very similarly to
rule 26(13)(a). That statute restricted Supreme Court
review of these de novo trials in district court to
situations involving a challenge to a statute's validity or
constitutionality.5 We held that the statute was
constitutional as the restriction complained of was in fact
found in the Constitution itself. The validity of Lyte has
never been questioned.

4. The city courts were created in 1901 Utah Laws chapter 109
and were part of a statutory scheme that included both city
courts and justice courts. In 1977, when the circuit court
system was adopted by the legislature, all city courts were
eliminated. See 1901 Utah Laws ch. 109, § 1; 1977 Utah Laws
ch. 77.
5. Section 1668 of Utah Compiled Laws (1917) provided:
Appeals shall lie from the final judgments
of justices of the peace, in civil and
criminal cases, to the district courts, on
both questions of law and fact, with such
limitations and restrictions as are or may
be provided by law; and the decision of
the district courts on such appeals shall
be final, except in cases involving the
validity or constitutionality of a statute.
Utah Compiled Laws tit. 21, ch. 3, § 1668 (1917); see also
1919 Utah Laws ch. 34, § 1717.
M^
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Before the 1984 amendments to article VIII, then,
the "appeal* right in article I, section 12, in the context
of review of justice court decisions, was satisfied by a
one-judge trial de novo procedure unless the validity or
constitutionality of a statute was raised before the justice
court. Neither a review on the record nor a review by a
multijudge panel was a constitutionally necessary part of the
appeals process from justice court decisions. Therefore, for
us to find that the procedure in use since statehood and now
embodied in rule 26 is now unconstitutional, we would have to
conclude that the 1984 amendments to article VIII require
that all appeals from courts of record, including the circuit
court, entitle the appellant to a plenary review on the
record.
The amendments in 1984 substantially altered
article VIII. In particular, old section 9 was repealed and
is no longer pertinent. Much of its substance is now found
in article VIII, section 5, which provides:
The district court shall have
original jurisdiction in all matters
except as limited by this constitution or
by statute, and power to issue all
extraordinary writs. The district court
shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of

all other courts, both original and
appellate, shall be provided by statute.
Except for matters filed originally with
the Supreme Court, there shall be in all
cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 (emphasis added). The specific
language in the pre-1984 article VIII, section 9 that
permitted appeals from justice courts to district courts and
described restrictions on any further appeal is missing from
the new article VIII. Was the elimination of this language
by the 1984 amendment intended to abrogate the single-judge
de novo "appeal" of justice court decisions? We find no
indication of such an intention.
Article VIII, section 5 clearly provides that "the
district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided
by statute" and that "the jurisdiction of all other courts,
both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute."
This language is plain and unambiguous. It acknowledges that
the district court may be given appellate jurisdiction, which
it has had since statehood with respect to justice court
appeals, and it also gives the legislature the authority to
bestow original and appellate jurisdiction on other courts.
n

This simply recognizes the well-settled principle that it is
within the legislature's prerogative to define a court's
appellate jurisdiction over decisions from any lower court so
long as such jurisdiction is not expressly prohibited by the
state constitution. £&&, e.g., State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d
439, 441 (Utah 1983). And as Lyte held, there is nothing in
article I, section 12 that precludes the legislature from
establishing a trial de novo in another court as an "appeal."
Looking beyond the plain language of article VIII,
section 5, we find nothing in the legislative history of the
1984 amendments to article VIII that indicates an intention
to prohibit single-judge de novo "review" of justice court
decisions or to require a plenary, on-the-record review of
that de novo proceeding. In fact, the reports prepared for
the legislature by the Constitutional Revision Commission
("CRC"), which held hearings on the need for a judicial
article amendment and had drafted the specific language of
new article VIII, section 5, never mention this possibility.
Instead, they reflect an intention on the CRC's part that the
legislature have the flexibility to determine the jurisdiction
of most of the state's courts. For example, in discussing
the proposed language for article VIII, section 5, which
indicates that the original and appellate jurisdictions of
all courts other than district courts should be provided by
statute, the 1982 CRC report stated:
The provisions mandating a right of appeal
directly to the district court from
justices [sic] of the peace courts is
[sic] deleted from the new language,
thereby providing the legislature the
flexibility to establish an orderly
hierarchy of appeals which could further
reduce duplication and provide more
efficient adjudication of cases.
Office of Legislative Research, Report of the Constitutional
Revision Commission 23 (January 1982). In discussing the
same section in the 1983 report, the CRC stated: "The
jurisdiction of . . . courts [other than the district
courts] is to be established by statute." Office of
Legislative Research, Report of the Constitutional
Revision
Commission 28 (January 1984). The CRC thought that the
authority to establish the jurisdiction of most state courts
properly lies with the legislature.
If the 1984 amendments were intended to prohibit
the then-existing appeal procedure for justice courts, it is
more than strange that neither the CRC nor anyone in the
legislature thought it necessary to observe that passage of
the amendments would void rule 26(13)(a) or that new
legislation would be needed immediately to provide for

justice court appeals. In fact, the then-existing statutory provisions dealing with justice court appeals remained
unchanged until 1986, when they were amended to shift
justice court appeals from the district court to the circuit
court as part of a general reshuffling of jurisdiction that
accompanied the creation of the court of appeals. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-4-7.5 (1987) (amended 1988 & 1989).
However, the limitations on further review of the judgment
involved in the de novo proceeding remained unchanged from
its 1896 formulation. Compare Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-35-26(k)(l) (Supp. 1986) with Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-35-26(13)(a) (Supp. 1987).
Because nothing in the plain language of the
amended article VIII, section 5 or in its history suggests
an intent to require review on the record for a trial de
novo where justice court appeals are concerned, we conclude
that rule 26(13)(a) satisfies article I, section 12 and
article VIII, section 5.
The next question is whether the court ot appeals
correctly concluded that Christensen failed to properly
raise the issue of the invalidity or unconstitutionality of
the ordinance under which he was charged. As mentioned
earlier, Christensen provided no transcript of the circuit
court proceeding to the court of appeals. Therefore, the
appeals court reviewed the pleadings filed in justice court
and circuit court and concluded that he had not raised any
such issue. We see no reason to disturb that conclusion.
The court of appeals' decision dismissing
Christensen's appeal for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

DURHAM, Justi c £:

(Di ssenti ng)

I dissent. Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution provides that w[i]n criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right to . . . appeal in all cases."
The question before this Court is whether a new trial
constitutes an "appeal" within the meaning of that
constitutional provision. I grant everything that the
majority opinion has said about the history of the
constitutional language and the statutory definitions of
jurisdiction. I point out/ however, that this Court is both
the ultimate source of content for the meaning of
constitutional language and the promulgating agency for rule
26(13)(a). 1 That being the case, I see no reason for us
to maintain a semantically and conceptually illogical and
confusing premise merely because it has its roots in
history. The majority is correct in saying that "in Utah
. . . it is settled that the right to an 'appeal' from a
court not of record is satisfied by provision for a trial de
novo in a court of record." That is true, however, only
because of peculiar constitutional language that has now
been removed from the judicial article, i.e., the former
constitutional provision calling trials de novo "appeals."2
Now that the anomalous language has been removed from the
constitution, it should no longer be "settled" as a matter
of constitutional law that the requirement of appellate
review may be satisfied by a new trial in a court of
limited, or even general, jurisdiction. I would conclude
that the 1984 amendments to article VIII do indeed require
that a defendant be entitled in every case to one plenary
review on the record.
1. This Court, in "In re Rules of Procedure and Evidence to
be used in the Courts of this State," filed January 13, 1989,
provided per curiam:
Pursuant to the provisions of article
VIII, section 4 of the Constitution of
Utah, as amended, and rule 11-101(3)(E) of
the Code of Judicial Administration, the
Court adopts all existing statutory rules
of procedure and evidence contained in
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-1 to -33 (1982 &
Supp. 1988) not inconsistent with or
superseded by rules of procedure and
evidence heretofore adopted by this Court,
with the exception of section 77-35-12(g)
(see State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah
1987) and section 77-35-21.5(4)(c) and

(d)) (£££ State v. Copelanfl, [765 p.2d
2.

1266 (Utah 1988)]). Effective as of
January 1 1989.
See old article VIII, section 9.
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I have no quarrel with the notion that the
Legislature may bestow both original and appellate
jurisdiction on any court. I do contest the implicit
assertion of the majority, however, that the Legislature,
rather than this Court, may decide what is adequate to
constitute an ••appeal" within the meaning of article VIII of
the constitution. I also maintain that contemporary
understanding of the concept of criminal appeals mandates at
least review of convictions upon a record by a superior
tribunal for purposes of detecting procedural and evidentiary
errors, as well as constitutional ones. The principle that
the Legislature might have the power, for example, to grant
new trials in felony criminal cases in satisfaction of the
right-to-appeal provisions of our constitution is disturbing
and anomalous and would not, I suspect, be upheld by the
majority. Yet the majority's logic must embrace that
result.3 i submit, rather, that the following doctrine
regarding the definition of an "appeal" should be accepted as
being constitutionally required by this Court in all criminal
cases:
The standard rule is that appellate
jurisdiction is the authority to review
the actions or judgments of an inferior
tribunal upon the record made in that
tribunal, and to affirm, modify or reverse
such action or judgment.
Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d
281, 284 (Utah 1976).

3. This result would of course not have been possible under
old section 9 because there the constitution itself limited
new trials as "appeals" to justice court proceedings, which
did not include felony criminal cases. There is now no such
constitutional limitation, and the majority opinion offers no
way of distinguishing so-called appeals at any level.

